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A gasoline subsidy distorts the gasoline market with the resulting inefficiencies and takes 
substantial revenues that arguably could be spent elsewhere with a better impact on economic growth. 
Governments with such subsidies are aware of their cost yet face difficulties in removing the policy 
because of strong resistance from the public. This the is discusses in three essays the problem faced by 
the government in removing the gasoline subsidy and provides an alternative policy in reducing the 
subsidy cost applied to the case of Indonesia. 
In the first essay, we examine the decision-making process from the government’s perspective 
that has an objective of generating savings to fundother programs while maintaining political power, and 
the influence that the general population has over the decision. Despite the immense literature on political 
power, there has yet to be any research that mathemtically models the decision-making process of a 
government with influences from the general population. Under the benchmark scenario, the equilibrium 
strategy is to keep the subsidy intact. However, the results are found to be very sensitive to the magnitude 
of the shift in political power as well as the preferences of both the government and the people. 
In the second essay, we estimate the cross-price elasticity of regular gasoline with respect to 
premium gasoline price. The importance of such knowledge is to accurately determine the impact of fuel
pricing policy that tends to have different rates of tax or subsidy depending on the grade of gasoline. 
Using data on the Mexican gasoline market, regular gasoline demand is estimated with an Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag (ARDL) model. Endogeneity of the price and structural break are also investigated. The 
cross-price elasticities between regular and premium gasoline is found to be -0.895, which confirms high 
substitutability among gasoline with different grades. 
In the third essay, we look at the unique case of Indonesia that only provides a subsidy for regular 
gasoline and in turn proposes an alternative policy that introduces a subsidy for premium gasoline at a 
lower rate to reduce the overall gasoline subsidy cost. There has yet to be any research that simulates 
price controls for gasoline with different grades. Simulations based on the calibrated demand are 
performed and the results confirm the existence of potential savings that are largely determined by the 
cross-price elasticities between regular and premium gasoline. The benchmark scenario, based on a recent 
study of substitutability between gasoline by grades, r sults in an 11.5% reduction in subsidy cost of 
around 950 million USD with a subsidy rate of Rp 2,254/liter. Furthermore, the optimal rate of subsidy 
for premium gasoline results in a reduction of inefficiency as consumers’ welfare increase by 6.8 trillion 
rupiahs (or 560 million USD).
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
One of the most prevalent strategies to improve public welfare in oil-producing countries is the 
gasoline subsidy. Unfortunately, the policy will distort the gasoline market with the resulting 
inefficiencies and substantial increase in external costs. The World Bank recommends that developing 
nations abandon the gasoline subsidy (Loveless 2015). The opportunity cost of such policy is high and i  
fact rising (Coady et al. 2010). Figure 1.1 shows the actual Indonesian government expenditures for 
energy, which consists of electricity and fuels. The gasoline subsidy is a subset of fuel subsidies along 
with diesel and kerosene. In 2014, energy subsidies were approximately 16% of overall government’s 
expenditure amounting to about 280 trillion rupiahs or 23 billion USD (1 USD = Rp 12,000). Based on 
Indonesia’s annual state budget, the energy subsidies are mainly for fuel subsidies as shown in Figure 1.2. 
More than 80% is for gasoline, diesel and kerosene. Also, notice that the actual expenditure is almost 
always above the budget. Consequently, the call to reform the fuel subsidy policy has been stronger in 
recent years, especially for gasoline that takes up more than 60% of the budget for fuel subsidies 
(Departemen Keuangan 2012). Indonesia is just an exmple, but there are studies that examined other 
countries as well. Del Granado et al. (2012) looked at twenty different countries and found that fuel 
subsidies have a high opportunity cost and also provide unequal benefits. In fact, the richest 20 percent of 
households capture, on average, more than six timeshigher than the poorest 20 percent (Coady et al. 
2015). These governments are well aware of the urgency for a policy reform, yet they remain hesitant. 
 
Figure 1.1 Actual energy subsidy expenditures in Indonesia 




Figure 1.2 Energy subsidy budget expenditure for Indonesia 
Source: Badan Pusat Statistik (2016b) 
Governments have a difficult time removing the policy because the public rejects such a cut, 
especially for gasoline, which affects transportation costs within the country. For example, numerous 
times the Indonesian government has tried to lift the policy only to be met with public protests resisting 
such a direct decrease in purchasing power (Quiano 2012, Cochrane 2013). A lot of studies have been 
done to analyze such economic impacts of phasing out asoline subsidy for Indonesia. Adam and Lestari 
(2008) estimated that an increase in the price of oil correlates negatively with households’ welfare. 
Clements et al. (2007) showed that removing the Indonesian subsidy increases aggregate price levels and 
reduces real output, while Dartanto (2013) found that ere will be an increase of poverty. Arguably, these 
outcomes might agitate the people and cause a significant drop in the government’s political support.  
The previous research studies the impacts of a gasoline subsidy phase-out policy, especially on 
the welfare and income of the people, but does not acknowledge the convoluted problem of politics and 
economics faced by the government. The contribution of this thesis is to complement the above impact 
literature by modeling the decision-making process by the government and possible alternatives for 
implementing subsidy reform in three essays.  
In the first essay, we start by focusing on the problem faced by the government, politically and 
economically. From the government’s perspective, a cut in the gasoline subsidy can generate savings to 
fund other projects but can potentially cause political instability because of the pressure from the people 
who reject the idea. The question becomes "What is the optimal subsidy cut that the government could 
implement without jeopardizing its political power?" Despite the immense literature on political power, 
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there has yet to be any research that mathematically models the decision-making process of a government 
with influences from the general population. A game th ory model is developed based on the reciprocal 
power problem by Harsanyi (1962), which is used to etermine the influence that a group has over the 
government’s decision. The political power is structured based on selectorate theory by Bueno de 
Mesquita (2005). Nash’s (1950) bargaining solution is then applied to solve the mathematical model. 
Such a solution determines the optimal condition betwe n the parties in which the joint utility is 
maximized while both players are better off. The model is based on the structure of the government of 
Indonesia but could be applied in any country. In the analysis, we evaluate how the people can influence 
the government’s subsidy removal plan and how far the government can push for a subsidy cut. Most 
importantly, the analysis gives us insights on the underlying reason why these governments remained 
hesitant to remove such policy. 
There are different fuel pricing policies and mechanisms (Kojima 2013). Developing countries 
that provide a gasoline subsidy commonly have different rates of subsidy based on the octane-level of 
gasoline. Indonesia for example, only provides subsidy for regular but not premium gasoline. The second 
essay focuses on different methods to estimate the own-price, cross-price, and income elasticities for 
gasoline by grade. These elasticities values are nec ssary for governments that implement different 
subsidy rates on gasoline by grade to accurately determine the impacts of different pricing policies. 
Furthermore, there is a gap in the literature because of the rarity of research on gasolines with different 
grades. The rarity is likely the result of limited available data on the consumption and price of gasoline by 
grade. Unfortunately, the data are not available to us for Indonesia that has a unique case. Looking at the 
literature, we found estimates of own-price elasticity for regular and premium gasoline in Mexico. In the 
case of Mexico, the price of gasoline is controlled by the government and it has been subsidized since
2006 (OGJ 2013). There are also other similarities, such as regular and premium gasoline are treated as 
different goods, since an increase in the price of regular gasoline is not necessarily followed with an 
increase in premium gasoline price (Yucatan Times 2016). Furthermore, Mexico does not have extreme 
seasonal changes throughout the year. However, there is a significant difference in the GDP/capita as 
Mexico's is almost three times higher. We assume that the result may be similar when Indonesia reaches 
higher levels of per capita income. Our contribution in this essay is to build upon and improve the on 
study we have found (Fullerton et al. 2015) that econometrically estimates regular and premium gasoline 
demand’s own-price elasticities. We improve on their work by specifically estimating own and cross-
price elasticities of regular gasoline using time-series. An Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model 
was selected because only some of the data are non-stationary and to tackle the issue of cointegration. We 
assume that the price of gasoline in Mexico is exogn us since the government sets the price, but later 
test this assumption for validity of the estimation results. We are able to increase the sample size and 
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perform much more substantive statistical testing including tests for structural change, stationarity and
cointegration. Not only do we provide a much improved model and results for policy makers interested in 
gasoline demand by grade, but also we apply the results in the following essay to examine the effects of 
differing price subsidy policies for different grades of gasoline. 
Given the difficulties of phasing out subsidies, we next propose a unique policy that could 
potentially reduce gasoline subsidy expenditures without the political backlash. Armed with the estimated 
cross elasticities in the second essay, we set up simulation experiments in the third essay that play upon 
differential subsidies for regular and premium gasoline. By providing a subsidy for regular gasoline only, 
Indonesia violated Ramsey’s (1927) tax rule in which taxes on rival commodities should leave the 
consumer’s relative choices unaltered. As a consequence, consumers lean heavily towards consuming 
regular gasoline. In order to correct the inefficien y caused by such a policy, the government could 
potentially introduce a subsidy on premium gasoline but at a lower rate to reduce the cost of the overall 
gasoline subsidy. Our unique contribution in this paper is by asking the question “What are the necessary 
conditions in the market for such a subsidy policy on premium gasoline to actually reduce total gasoline 
subsidy expenditure?” To answer this question, a demand system is modeled using a translog cost 
function (Christensen et al. 1973). The system is calibrated to replicate the gasoline market in Indonesia 
using a method by Rutherford (2002) starting with the elasticity values found in the second essay We also 
conduct a variety of sensitivity tests to account for the high uncertainty for the parameters in the model.. 
The outline for the rest of this thesis is as follows. The next chapter is the first thesis essay. In it 
we build the basic Harsanyi (1962) model and solve it using a Nash bargaining solution (1950). 
Selectorate theory is used to provide the structure of political power in the country. In our benchmark 
scenario, the equilibrium is for the government to abandon the subsidy removal plan, because the drop in 
political power is large. We found that the optimal strategy is very sensitive to the magnitude of the drop 
in political power. Furthermore, the preferences of b th the government and the general population play a 
major role in determining the optimal strategy. An important assumption is that the government can tackle 
the issue of inflation and somehow control the public protests. In conclusion, the government has to be 
vigilant before proceeding with the subsidy removal pl n. Depending on the current economic condition 
and political instability, implementing a subsidy cut might not be beneficial. 
The third chapter of this thesis is the second essay that estimates own-, cross-price and income 
elasticities of gasoline with different grades. We us  Mexican data and a time-series approach on monthly 
data from January 1999 to December 2014. The data are retrieved from Mexican National Institute of 
Statistics and Geography (INEGI 2016) and FRED database (Federal Reserve Economic Data 2016). We 
focus on the cross-price elasticity as its value is used extensively in the fourth chapter. A particular type 
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of ARDL model, an unrestricted error-correction model, approach results in the following long-run 
elasticities of 0.895 for the cross-price elasticity of regular gasoline with respect to the price of premium 
gasoline. The income elasticity for regular gasoline is 0.73, while the own-price elasticity is relatively 
high at -1.91. 
The fourth chapter relates to the third essay that simulates a proposed subsidy policy for premium 
gasoline. Using Mexican elasticities calibrated to Indonesia’s gasoline demand, simulations were 
performed. The results confirm the existence of potential saving by providing a subsidy for premium 
gasoline. The magnitude of the savings ranges greatly but is largely dependent on the cross-price 
elasticity between regular and premium gasoline. Under the benchmark scenario when premium gasoline 
is subsidized at a rate of Rp 2,254/liter decreasing premium price by 23.7%, we confirm a cost reduction 
of government’s gasoline subsidy expenditure by 11.5% or roughly 950 million USD. The subsidy on 
premium also improves consumer welfare by 6.8 trillion rupiahs or around 560 million USD. Lastly, we 
conclude the thesis with overall results and implications to policy-makers on the gasoline subsidy issue.
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CHAPTER 2  
EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGY FOR GASOLINE SUBSIDY POLICY REMOVAL 
2.1 Introduction 
Oil-rich countries implement gasoline subsidies to distribute the economic rent acquired from the 
low extraction cost of crude oil to the people. It effectively lowers their transportation costs and icreases 
gasoline's affordability to the public. However well-intentioned, the policy will distort the gasoline market 
with the resulting inefficiencies, not to mention external costs associated with high gasoline consumption, 
such as emission of local pollutants, traffic congestions and accidents (Davis 2013). The generally higher 
prices of crude oil after 2000, even with the current r spite, have alarmed these governments and for some 
oil-producing countries, the effect is more significant because of decreasing oil production. For example, 
Indonesia was a net exporter of crude oil before becoming a net importer in 2004. As the country became 
more developed, the demand for gasoline also grew, which further aggravated the inefficiency of the 
policy. The opportunity cost of the gasoline subsidy is high and in fact rising (Coady et al. 2010), while 
the World Bank recommends that developing nations abandon the gasoline subsidy altogether (Loveless 
2015).  
Figure 2.1 shows the trend in Indonesia’s government expenditures for fuel subsidies had risen to 
about 15% of overall government expenditure by 2014 amounting to about 280 trillion rupiahs or around 
23 billion USD. Based on Fiscal Note of State Budget in 2012 (Departemen Keuangan 2012), more than 
60% of the fuel subsidies were intended for gasoline with around 35% for diesel. Given its magnitude, 
there is a strong urgency for Indonesia’s government to remove fuel subsidies, especially for gasoline. 
Gasoline is under the spotlight not only because it has the highest percentage of the fuel subsidies, but 
also because diesel fuel is mostly purchased by large trucks for industrial use. 
In Indonesia, the gasoline subsidy is provided in the form of underpricing. The national oil 
company, Pertamina, is the only company that can legally import, refine, and distribute the subsidized 
gasoline, which is regular gasoline. The executive branch of the government sets the domestic price and 
compensates Pertamina for the difference in market price including an allowed profit that is determined 
by the House of Representatives in the annual State’s budget. Thus, the price cannot be changed often 
because it requires a change in the annual budget. Th refore, a spike in the market price of crude oil c uld 
result in an under- or over-estimation of the expenditure. The worst case scenario is that the price of crude 
oil rises sharply within a year, forcing the government to make a significantly higher expenditure. 




Figure 2.1 Indonesia’s fuel subsidy budget  
Source: Badan Pusat Statistik (2016b) 
Gasoline subsidy policy has become one of the most heated topics in the House of 
Representatives. The government began to strategize a plan to remove the subsidy entirely and accrue the 
economic rents as the government needed money to fund other projects. Of course, the public rejected the 
idea since a higher gasoline price causes inflation and effectively lowers the purchasing power of the 
people. Numerous times the Indonesian government has ried to lift the subsidy only to be met with 
public protests (Quiano 2012, Cochrane 2013). In addition, the opposition claims that the idea is against 
the vision of the founding fathers that natural resources have to be managed by the government (Gie 
2011). Despite the unpopularity of a subsidy cut and the risk of losing political power, there is a 
significant potential for the released budget to fund other projects that could further promote economic 
growth and improve social welfare. From an economic perspective, the government should have 
sufficient money from subsidy removal to compensate the people to make them at least indifferent and 
thus, the government should be able to cut the entire subsidy. However, we have not seen such a case to 
have occurred in any government. 
The main contribution of this essay is to complement current studies that analyze the impacts of a 
subsidy reform on welfare and income of the general population by focusing on the difficulty faced by the 
government in implementing the reform. We believe that political power, or the ability to stay in office, is 
another significant factor that affects the governme t’s decision. This paper extends the studies of 
selectorate theory by Bueno de Mesquita (2005) by applying a game theory model based on Harsanyi’s 
(1960). The Nash bargaining solution (1952) is then applied to find the optimal strategy for the 
government. Despite the enormous political science literature on political power, there has yet to be any
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studies that mathematically model the decision-making process of the government with influences from 
the general population.  
From the government’s perspective, a cut in the gasoline subsidy can generate savings to fund 
other projects that have a greater impact on economic growth. Yet, such a policy can potentially cause 
political instability. The people strongly reject the idea of a subsidy cut and are willing to exert some 
pressure on the government. Then what is the optimal subsidy cut that the government could implement 
without jeopardizing its political power? In the analysis, we evaluate how the people can influence the 
government’s subsidy removal plan and how far the government can push for a subsidy cut. Most 
importantly, the analysis gives us insights on the underlying reason why the government has remained 
hesitant to remove the subsidy. 
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In the next section, our literature review shows how this 
essay fits in the current literature. In section 2.3, we present our methodology. Our model differs from 
Bueno de Mesquita (2005) selectorate theory because of a difference in the government’s objective. 
Nash's (1950) bargaining solution is then applied to the model with analytical results presented. In section 
2.4, different removal policy plans based on real-world scenarios are considered. Simulation results are 
shown to illustrate the effects of different parameterization of the model in section 2.5. Since our 
benchmark parameters are based on uncertain preference, we carry out sensitivity analyses in section 2.6.
In the last section, we conclude with insights on the results and caveats on the limitations of the model. 
2.2 Literature review 
Many studies research the welfare impacts of a subsidy reform in Indonesia. Adam and Lestari 
(2008) estimated that an increase in the price of oil correlates negatively with households’ welfare. 
Clements et al. (2007) showed that removing the subsidy increases aggregate price levels and reduces real 
output, while Dartanto (2013) found that there will be an increase of poverty. These researchers studied 
the impacts of a gasoline subsidy phase out policy, especially on the welfare and income of the people. 
However, they did not acknowledge the political difficulties faced by the government from a phase out. 
They recognize that the policy reform causes inflation but did not consider such effects on the 
government’s decision. Other studies provide suggestions on government’s approach to subsidy reform, 
but they were done qualitatively (Coady et al. 2010, del Granado 2012, Coady et al. 2015). This essay 
fills this gap in the literature by focusing on the political decision-making process faced by a government 
with dual objectives of generating savings that can fund other projects while maintaining political power. 
Furthermore, the model is developed mathematically. 
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The model used to illustrate the change in politica power is structured on the notable work of 
selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita 2005). In the sel ctorate theory model, the players are: a leader 
(president), a winning coalition, the selectorate, nd residents. Selectorates are a portion of resident  that 
are eligible to vote. Within the selectorates, there are “elites” who have control over a large number of 
selectorates. In order for a leader to stay in office, a specific number of these elite selectorates are 
necessary, called a winning coalition. The leader will adjust policies to keep the winning coalition 
members satisfied so they do not defect to opposition groups. Each elite selectorate member has the 
objective of being included in the winning coalition for the privileges provided by the leader. In the 
process, these individuals may change loyalty to prolong their position as winning coalition members 
even with different leaders. Some elite selectorates, not in league with the current leader, may want to 
become members of the winning coalition of other potential leaders instead, hoping for a change in 
leadership. In addition, there are a few elite selectorates that even want to become the leader themselves 
in the future. However, our model differs from selectorate theory because instead of having the sole 
objective of staying in office, the government wants to generate enough savings to have extra funds. 
Political scientists have done substantial research on the effect of economic conditions on 
presidential popularity. Arguably, presidential popularity represents the support of the public i.e. political 
power in a democratic system. Monroe (1978) found that inflation has a significant negative influence on 
presidential popularity in United States, with impacts remaining politically and statistically significant up 
to one-year after the initial occurrence. Her result using Gallup Polls from 1950 to 1974 suggests that an 
increase of 1 percentage point in the annual rate of inflation that is maintained for one year will result in a 
decrease in popularity of 3.75 percentage points. For the case of inflation, the effect is significant d 
persistent because of the impact on the real income of the people. A study by del Granado (2012) on 
twenty developing countries found that on average,  $0.25 decrease in the per liter fuel subsidy results in 
a 5% decrease in income. Hence, implementing a subsidy policy reform presents great difficulty for the 
government because inflation will have an adverse effect on its objective to maintain political power. 
Arguably, a leader has an objective of maintaining political power because he or she wants to get 
reelected. Even in countries with presidential term limits, those in the incumbent's political party sill 
desire the incumbent's popularity and political support to ensure political stability. If the government loses 
a substantial amount of support, the political opposition could take advantage of the circumstances 
resulting in political instability as the probability of the government to get overthrown is higher. 
Consequently, it will affect investments and ultimately economic growth (Alesina et al. 1996a, 199b). 
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2.3 Methodological approach 
In this section, a model is developed to replicate the problem faced by the government in 
removing the gasoline subsidy. The model is based on the structure of the government of Indonesia but 
could be applied in any country. There are two parts to our model, the structure of political interaction, 
which will be based on selectorate theory, and the mathematical model based on the reciprocal power 
problem. The selectorate theory gives us insights in erms of changes in political power experienced by 
the leader and also the general population. While Harsanyi’s (1962) model will be used to evaluate how 
the people can influence the government’s subsidy removal plan. An important assumption is that 
removing the subsidy will cause a jump in the domestic price of gasoline. 
In Indonesia’s case, the president is considered th leader, since he holds the authority over the 
decision to remove the subsidy. The cabinet, House f Representatives and some elite politicians are 
considered to be the winning coalition. The cabinet m mbers are chosen by the president, while members 
of the House of Representatives mainly consist of party members who have won legislative election. We 
considered both to be in the winning coalition. There may be opposition  in the House of Representatives, 
but we assume that it is not enough to reject the gov rnment’s decision regarding the price of gasoline. I  
addition, there are a number of elite selectorates that support the leader but are not in the winning 
coalition. Even though they support the leader, they ar  not as loyal as winning coalition members and 
can be swayed by the opposition depending on the circumstances. To complete the theory, recall that all 
selectorates are residents that are eligible to vote in presidential elections. 
Since the subsidy policy puts a large budget constraint on the government’s expenditure, the 
leader arguably prefers to have it removed. The released budget can be used on other projects that not 
only can boost the popularity of the leader, but also can be shared with members of the winning coaliti n 
to improve their loyalty. The leader would only prefer to retain the subsidy if the winning coalition 
mainly consists of people that receive benefits from the subsidy. Since Pertamina is in charge of the 
regular gasoline market, we can safely assume that mos winning coalition members are against keeping 
the subsidy. However, in the case that a removal policy comes with a large drop in political support, the 
leader would have to abandon the removal plan. At the same time, the general population prefers the 
government to leave the subsidy intact because of the effect on their purchasing power. This friction 
between the leader and the people presents an opportunity for elite selectorates that oppose the 
government to gain support and ultimately political power. 
If the subsidy is removed, the leader and winning coalition are winners, while residents suffer. 
According to a report done by the World Bank (Diop 2014), fuel subsidies disproportionately benefit 
households at the top of the income distribution: 84 percent of all benefits go to the top half of households 
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by consumption, and only 16 percent to the bottom half. In fact, the richest 20 percent of households 
capture, on average, more than six times that of the poorest 20 percent (Coady et al. 2015). Therefore, 
high income people are the most directly affected, while the low income group suffers from inflation of 
transportation costs. We argue that high income people are more motivated and willing to protest since 
they have resources. They can pay the media or even get poor people to join their protests. Furthermore, 
elite selectorates usually belong to the high income group and thus, if the leader reluctantly ignores th e 
elites, it could negatively affect its political power. A report by Bloomberg (2014) mentioned that there 
are a lot of people, even soldiers and the navy, involved in fuel smuggling. Thus, a subsidy removal my 
cut the stream of income to some navy generals, who are highly likely to be among the elites. Therefor, 
the leader should approach this issue in a meticulous manner because it could potentially affect the 
winning coalition members. A few elites may now be highly motivated to overthrow the current 
government because of a loss of income and in doing so, attempt to persuade some members of the 
winning coalition to defect. Coupled with protests by the high income group that also lost some of its 
purchasing power, the aftermath could be devastating to the leader. 
In general, the government has to decide whether to p oceed with the subsidy removal policy or 
abandon it. Each action taken by the government will have an impact on the people and on itself. The 
government’s choice is illustrated in Figure 2.2. The gain for both parties from each action, or the net 
effect, can be positive or negative as indicated by the +/- in the figure. We believe that the people can
exert some pressure on the government and influence the decision. The government is aware of the 
consequences if they ignore the public protests. Hence, the decision on the removal policy is a bargain 
between the government and the general population. In this case, a Nash bargaining solution (1950) is the 
suitable model to solve the equilibrium strategy. In its simplest terms, the Nash equilibrium strategy 
requires both parties to receive a positive gain. If one party is worse off, that specific option is definitely 
off the table, even if the other party receives substantial benefit. So, we are looking for options that 
guarantee a positive return for both parties. In our case, the gains in both options for both parties ar  
compared and the one that gives back the highest return is the optimal strategy. 
In order to get a clear understanding of the interaction between the government and the people, 
we describe our reciprocal power model in the next s c ion. We start with the status quo and then we will 




Figure 2.2 Illustration of the government's option and the consequences 
2.3.1 Status Quo 
We assume that the selectorate and non-voting resident  already know that the government wants 
to carry out a policy reform, which we consider thestatus quo. The government can either implement or 
abandon a subsidy removal. Therefore, if the governm nt in the end decides to abandon a plan for subsidy 
removal, in the sense that “the leader listens to the will of the people”, there will be a gain of trust or 
political power by the government. The source of the gain is from a group of selectorates that got swayed. 
Some elites selectorates might be more motivated to be in the winning coalition now because the positive 
response from the public makes it seems like the leader is going to stay in power for a long period of time. 
We will use an index from 0 to 100 to represent political power. If the leader has the loyalty of all elite 
selectorates, the index value is 100. The current political power of the government is denoted by ,
which also implies full loyalty of the winning coalition. If the leader replaces a winning coalition me ber 
with another individual from elite selectorates, the political power index stays constant. The index 
becomes 0 if all of the winning coalition members defect to another potential leader. A value of zero 
means that the current leader has no political power and can be easily overthrown. We argue that the 
leader cares about the money gained by the policy reform and also its own political support. The overall 
expenditure budget for the government is denoted by . Both elements, funds and political support, have 
to exist to have positive utility. Therefore, we choose the leader’s, or in a more general sense, the 
government’s utility function to be in the Cobb-Douglas form (Chiang et al. 2005). The government’s 
preference for expenditure is denoted by , while its preference for political power is denoted by . The 
utility level of the government at the status quo, where they want to remove the subsidy but have not yet 
implemented any decision, is shown in Equation (2.1). 
 = ( , ) =  (2.1) 
, > 0, + = 1 
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As for the general population, only elite selectorates care about the shift in power, since they want 
to acquire political power for themselves, either to be included in the winning coalition of the current 
leader or other potential leaders, or even to be a potential leader themselves. For our model, we aggregate 
the selectorate and non-voting residents and assume that the aggregated utility results in a utility function 
similar to the government’s. The aggregate households expenditure is denoted by  and the preference 
for expenditure is denoted by . The political power for the general population comes from elite 
selectorates that are not included in the winning coalition and is denoted by . These elites have no 
reason to be loyal to the current leader due to an absence of privilege. The preference for political power 
is denoted by . The benchmark utility level for the public is shown in Equation (2.2) below. 
 = ( , ) =  (2.2) 
, > 0, + = 1 
+ = 100 
2.3.2 Abandon subsidy removal 
If the government decides to abandon any plan for subsidy removal, its expenditure will remain 
the same at . However, the general population will be content and some group within the selectorate 
probably has more trust in the leader as previously mentioned. Therefore, the leader will gain some 
political support, . This political power gain means a loss of political power held by the general 
population. As for the general population, the expenditure will also be intact at . The expected utilities 
for the government and general population, if the government abandons the plan, are as follows: 
= ( , + )      (2.3) 
= ( , − )  
2.3.3 Execute subsidy removal policy 
Let’s say the government decides to proceed and remov  the subsidy. It will gain a saving of  
that equals the subsidy budget. Since the general population will resent the government for doing so, 
arguably the people will have a stronger opposition against the leader and thus there will be a loss of 
political power . Assuming that there will be public protests, which probably result in a riot, the 
government actually faces a “penalty”, , that will definitely lower the utility level of the government. 
This penalty can come from additional expenditure to cease public protest, loss of loyalty from winning 
coalition members, or both. There are various reasons why a winning coalition member may want to 
defect. Severe protests fueled by the opposing elite selectorates may change how a winning coalition 
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member views the leader’s ability to stay in office. A lot of studies have shown that riots and violence 
cause political instability (Goldstone et al. 2010, Jong-A-Pin 2009). The opportunity cost of being loyal is 
to look for chances to be a winning coalition member for other potential future leaders.  
As for the general population, they are worse off because of an increase in price. We assume that 
the people are myopic and what matters to them is their expenditure. They ignore the welfare that is 
gained by the whole economy with the subsidy cut. Dahl (2012) found own annual price elasticity of 
gasoline demand in Indonesia of -0.2. Then if the subsidy is removed, gasoline consumption on aggregate 
will decrease but the expenditure on gasoline will increase. The extra money that they have to spend on 
gasoline is what is troubling the minds of the peopl . We assume the consumers respond to this increase 
in expenditure as their loss ∗. We will use * for gains or losses experienced by the people. In terms of 
political power, the general population gains political power  because the selectorate and even the elites 
are now opposing the leader. The act of the people going to the streets in protest will bear some cost∗ to 
themselves. As a result, the expected utilities for both groups, if the government moves forward with the 
plan, are as follows: 
= ( + , − ) −      (2.4) 
= ( − ∗, + ) − ∗  
The act of removing the subsidy would initiate conflict and the rejection by the people is probably 
stronger than the approval of the people when the gov rnment retains the subsidies. Therefore, we assume 
that > .  
2.3.4 Nash Bargaining Solution 
Nash’s bargaining problem solution is applied to determine the optimal strategy for the 
government. The setup of the model is basically a bargaining game between the government and the 
people with the stakes being money and political stabili y. Therefore, the government ends up gaining 
political power and losing money or the other way around. While at the same time, losses to one party 
mean gains by the other. Since we are trying to determine the highest gain in utility for both parties, the 
difference between the utility levels in each scenario is required. Since the equilibrium is when both 
parties are better off, the government and the people have to experience an increase in their own utility 
level for that specific option. Otherwise, the decision is left to the government and they should choose 
their own best option, which depends on their changes in expenditure, political power, and preferences. 
The Nash bargaining model is shown as the multiplicative function below. 
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Basically, the government chooses the option (execute or abandon) that maximizes the joint utility, 
subject to the condition that the neither the government nor the people suffer a loss from the chosen 
option. Substituting in the utilities for the government and the general population from Equations (2.2), 
(2.3) and (2.4), our model becomes 
max =
 ( + , − ) − − ( , ) − ( , + ) − ( , ) ∗
 ( − , + ∗) − ∗ − ( , ) − ( , − ∗) − ( , )  
Simplifying further, 
 max =
 ( + ) ( − ) − − ( + ) ∗
 ( − ) ( + ) − ∗ − (100 − − )  (2.6) 
By looking at Equation (2.6), if all the parameters a e known and the utility is negative, the 
equilibrium is for the government to abandon the policy. From the government's perspective, it is a choi e 
between generating savings or political power. For the general population, it is the other way around. If 
the government proceeds with the plan, the savings generated will be offset by the loss in political power 
and the penalty and thus, we expect that the maximum utility  to be close to zero. In the case that the 
people have a high preference for their own daily expenditures, the money lost is going to drive the utility 
level down. The favorable condition would be when the jump in price is small meaning the loss in the 
people’s income is also small. Then the resulting utility loss for the people is close to zero, which happens 
when the government removes the subsidy during a period of low oil prices. In this case, lifting the policy 
is probably not a great idea because the savings generat d is miniscule, while the political power gained 
by abandoning the plan is more attractive. This might explain why the government has been hesitant to 
lift the policy. 
Although we include this policy in the analysis below, this model is not really so interesting 
because the government’s choice is very limited: do it or don’t. In other words, abandon removal subsidy 
or go ahead and remove the subsidy. Generate saving and hope that the hit is not strong enough to get 
overthrown. The plan is bound to fail because removing the subsidy entirely is difficult. Therefore, we put 
forward other options that have already been implemented in countries that provide gasoline subsidies. 
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2.4 Policy options 
The most common strategy is to implement a phase-out policy. The government only partially 
cuts the subsidy at any one time. Indonesia has done s  in 2000, 2002 and 2003 (Koran Sindo 2014) as 
has Malaysia in 2010 and 2013 (Bridel et al. 2014). When the resistance starts to build up and appears 
perilous, the government will then back down on the removal plan. We call this policy a percentage cut 
and lifting the subsidy is a subset of this policy. In this case, the government has greater flexibility. An 
additional case we consider is a partial subsidy removal plan with compensation benefits paid to the 
people as was implemented in Indonesia in 2005 and 2008 (World Bank 2012) and Iran in 2010 (Farzin et 
al. 2011). 
2.4.1 Percentage cut 
Suppose that instead of removing the subsidy entirely, the government plan is to remove a portion 
of the subsidy . For simplicity, we assume that the savings generated by the government and the 
political power shift will have a linear relationship with the portion of the subsidy lifted as shown in 
Equation (2.7). In addition, we assume a threshold  exists in the subsidy. If this threshold is not crossed, 
there will be no public protests. The people may not be happy, but they will comply with the government. 
The people will become discontented only after a large enough portion of the subsidy is taken out. We 
expect that  is close to zero, while   is close to 1, since the government desires a large percentage cut. 
Thus, 0 < < < 1. The utility levels for the government and the peol  for the abandon option are 
the same as before (Equation (2.3)). However, the utility for the executed policy differs based on whether 
the government crosses the threshold. The utilities in the case that the government crosses the threshold 
are shown below. 
= ( + , − ) −     (2.7) 
= ( + (− ∗) , + ) − ∗  
>  
We argue that the drop in political power is smaller in magnitude since the percent cut is lower. 
We use a new variable  to denote the smaller change in political power. Thus, < . The utility level 
for both parties, if the government proceeds with the subsidy cut below the threshold are as shown below. 
= ( + , − )     (2.8) 




The utilities for both parties, when the government proceeds with the subsidy cut, are similar to 
the earlier model shown in Equation (2.4). The only difference is that the amount of subsidy taken away is 
a percentage of the subsidy. Notice that the penalty is always going to drive the utility level down for both 
parties making it difficult to carry out a policy reform. For simulations, as explained later in section 2.5, 
we assume that the government has the necessary tools to dissuade people from performing public 
protests. Hence, the simulation will be based on the case that < . 
2.4.2 Percentage cut and compensation 
In 2010, Iran carried out an energy policy reform and cut a portion of the subsidy on gasoline. 
Half of the savings generated was redistributed to the people (Economist 2014). Let’s say this is the 
policy removal plan that the government has. The government returns an amount of money, , back to the 
general population. This amount is determined by how much the subsidy was cut. Consequently, there 
will be an additional variable in the expected utilities when the government proceeds at . Continuing 
from the previous policy option, there is a threshold percentage cut for which the general population 
will comply. Therefore, when the government decides to pass that threshold, the utilities for both parties 
are as shown in Equation (2.9). 
= ( + ( − ) , − ) −    (2.9) 
= ( + (− ∗ + ) , + ) − ∗ 
< , >  
We recognize that the compensation given by the govrnment could probably lower the 
unhappiness of the people and make the penalty t less severe. Therefore, we make the penalty a function 
of the amount of compensation. 
= ( , ) ,              ∗ = ( , )  
, ∗ < 0 
> 0, > 0 
  ℎ    ℎ    
The utilities for both parties when the government decides to stay within the threshold are as 
shown in Equation (2.10). 
= ( + ( − ) , − )     (2.10) 
= ( + (− ∗ + ) , + )  
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< , <  
Similarly, we only consider the case where the governm nt never crosses the threshold or is able 
to keep the penalty to a minimum.  There is no change for the case when the government abandons the 
policy. Therefore, the model results in a new Nash bargaining solution that is shown in Equation (2.11).  
max =
 ( + ( − ) , − ) − ( , + ) ∗
 ( + (− ∗ + ) , + ) − ( , − )                      (2.11) 
The optimal decision is when the joint utility, or the combined utility for the government and the 
people, is maximized. Notice if there is no compensation from the government, Equation (2.11) becomes 
the percentage cut policy. Additionally, if we drop the percentage , we will end up with Equation (2.6) 
with an exclusion of the penalty. 
Substitute Equation (2.1) and (2.2) into (2.11), 
 max =
 + ( − ) ( − ) − ( ) ( + ) ∗
 + (− ∗ + ) ( + ) − ( ) ( − )    
Use the first order condition to find the optimal choice for the percentage cut 
= ( + ) ( (− ∗ + ) + ) ( + ) (− ∗ + )
+ ∗( (− ∗ + ) + ) −
+ (− + ) ( ( − ) + ) − + ( − )( − ) + −  
Unfortunately, there is no closed form solution for the above model. However, we can further 
simplify the equation to get some insights. When the government decides on , we can simplify some of 
the terms: 
+  is the new level of political power held by the peo le or  
(− ∗ + ) +  is the new level of expenditure that the people have or  − +  is the new level of political support held by the government or  
( − ) +  is the new level of expenditure by the government or  
Substituting in the new variables, we can simplify the solution into: 
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= (− ∗ + ) + − +
+
( ) −      (2.12) 
By examining Equation (2.12) above, the optimal choi e of  depends on the utility gain for 
both the government and the people. If the government wants to maximize the amount of subsidy being 
cut, the difference in the gains between the two outcomes should be large and positive. This has to berue 
for both the government and the people. Notice that in the model setup (− + )  will always be negative. 
Therefore, the first term can only be negative if: 
(− ∗ + ) >     (2.13) 
The decrease in expenditure for the people after compensation will always bring  down. 
However, the magnitude will be largely determined by the preference of the people. See Equation (2.13). 
The magnitude of the terms on the left-hand side depends on γ, which reflects the people's preference for 
expenditure. Meanwhile, the magnitude on the right-hand side depends on δ, which reflects the people's 
preference for political power. If the people in aggregate only care about their expenditure, the first term 
of Equation (2.12) becomes negative. This effectively drags the optimal  down. 
For the second term of Equation (2.12), the relative change in political power for the government 
has to be less than the relative change in expenditure to increase the optimal . 
+
( )
> 0     (2.14) 
The above function can be rearranged to: −
>  
Equation (2.14) shows that the relative change is scaled by the preference of the government 
represented by the parameters , which reflects the government's preference for expenditure, and β, 
which reflects the government's preference for politica  power. If the government has a strong willingness 
to stay in power, the second term of Equation (2.12) could become negative and thus brings the optimal 
 down. Hence, our solution shows that the optimal str tegy is based on the circumstances of the subsidy 
policy and also the preferences of both the people and the government. In order to have a better picture of 




Since there is no closed form solution for the optimal  as shown in Equation (2.12), simulations 
are carried out based on the joint utility of the government and the general population (Equation 2.11). 
We simulate the percentage cut option with no reimbursement (r = 0) as the benchmark. The model is 
general and can be used to replicate any government’s condition. As a case study, we adjust the parameter 
values to be based on Indonesia’s government. The gov rnment expenditure () and household 
expenditure ( ) data from Badan Pusat Statistik (2016a, 2016c) are used in local currency (1 USD = Rp 
12,000). The budget for the fuel subsidy each year is lso available in the same database. For gasoline 
subsidy ( ) specifically, we use the fact that about 61% of the fuel subsidy budget is intended for gasoline 
(Departemen Keuangan 2012). We use 2012 data, since this is the most recent data that had been verified 
and finalized. As for the government’s political power, we have no data on how big the winning coalition 
is ( ). If the total members are large, the privilege must be given to more individuals and thus, comes at 
greater cost. Therefore, for simplicity we pick 45 because the current Indonesian president had a 
popularity of 45% at the time of election (Tempo 2014). These parameter data are summarized in the 
table below. 
Table 2.1 Data necessary for simulation 
Parameters Variable Value (trillion) 
Government Expenditure  Rp 1,435.41 
Household Expenditure  Rp 4,496.37 
Subsidy Budget  Rp 102.82 
Government’s power  45 
 
If the government cut 50% of the subsidy for gasoline ( = 0.5) that extra budget could be used to 
fund other programs. Meanwhile, the people will experience a rise in the price of gasoline and are forced 
to change their consumption bundle. They will adjust their gasoline consumption based on demand 
elasticities. The difference between the households’ expenditure level is the amount of money that the 
people lost ( ∗). The annual consumption in kiloliters (kl) and price of regular gasoline in local currency 
are readily available at Nota Keuangan APBN (Fiscal Note of State Budget) (Departemen Keuangan 
2012). The data on prices are in local currency. The consumption and price data on premium gasoline 
were acquired upon request from BPH Migas (The Downstream Oil and Gas Regulatory Agency) and are 




Table 2.2 Gasoline consumption data 
 Purchases (kl) Price (Rp) 
Regular gasoline 28,256,849 4,500 
Premium gasoline 1,020,514 9,500 
 
Indonesia is unique since only regular gasoline is subsidized. For simplicity, since the 
consumption of regular gasoline is so much higher tan premium gasoline, we assume that overall 
gasoline is subsidized. Furthermore, we ignore the substitution effect among different grades of gasoline 
when the subsidy is cut. We will return to these issues in a later essay.  
There are other parameters that are non-existent in the literature. For example, we have no idea 
about the preference of the government and the people. Therefore, we assume that the government is 
indifferent between income and political power (= 0.5) while the people prefer their income (= 0.7). 
Another necessary parameter is the drop in popularity that will be experienced by the government after 
the subsidy cut, . We assume that the effect is significant and thusa big drop in political power has to 
happen. In this case, we choose a value of 4.5 that represents a 10% drop in political power from 45 
( = 4.5). As for the case of abandoning the subsidy removal, the gain in political power is relatively 
small. We assume that the increase is only 1% of the current government’s political power (= 0.45). 
The parameters for simulation are shown in the table be ow. 
Table 2.3 Default parameters for simulation 
Parameters Symbol Value 
People’s political power*  100-45=55 
Government’s preference on expenditure  0.5 
Government’s preference on political power  0.5 
People’s preference on expenditure*  0.7 
People’s preference on political power*  0.3 
Drop in political support after subsidy cut (above threshold)  4.5 
Gain in political support by abandoning the plan  0.45 
Note: * indicates parameters for people’s utility. 
As previously mentioned, we assume that the governmnt has the necessary tools to dissuade the 
people from protesting. There is no penalty from the general population or at least it is negligible in 
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magnitude. Thus, the threshold is at full percentage cut (  = 100). The effect of inflation is also ignored. 
The simulation result is shown in Figure 2.3 below. 
 
Figure 2.3 The joint utility benchmark result 
The joint utility starts at a zero, with no change in utility from the status quo, and keeps 
decreasing before eventually increasing. However, th  u ility never reaches a positive value. If the joint 
utility decreases, either the government or the people is experiencing a loss and is better off with the other 
option. The kink at a low percentage cut is because of a large change in utility compared to the status q o. 
Next, we look at the utilities for the government ad the people separately for more insights on the 
simulation result. The utility for the government is shown in Figure 2.4, while that for the people is shown 
in Figure 2.5. 
 
Figure 2.4 The government's utility for each case 
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Notice that in the government’s utility level when proceeding with the plan is always less than the 
utility level when abandoning the subsidy removal pl n. Even though the government could generate 
savings from the cut in subsidy expenditures, the benefit is not enough to outweigh the loss in political 
power. Hence, the government is better off to abandon the policy. For the benchmark, we assume a 10% 
drop in the government’s political power (= 4.5). It is a relatively large swing of political power from 
the government to the opposition.  Of course, the preference of the government between political power 
and expenditures plays a significant part in determining the magnitude of the importance of that decrease 
in political power. 
As for the general population, the decrease in expenditure depends on the price elasticity. Since 
there is a large gain in political power, the resulting utility level is higher than at status quo. According to 
our model, it turns out that the people are actually better off when the government proceeds with the plan
because the gain in political power offsets the loss in income. See Figure 2.5. For the elite selectorates, 
who oppose the government, an increase in political power improves the chance of a change in leadership. 
Meanwhile, for selectorates in general, this increase in power is beneficial because they can exert moe 
pressure on the government to favor other policies or projects that benefit them.. 
 
Figure 2.5 The people’s utility for each case 
Our simulation shows that at the default parameters, he equilibrium strategy is to abandon any 
percentage cut in the subsidy. Proceeding with the subsidy removal plan will only benefit the people. 
However, we have a concern regarding the uncertainty of the chosen parameters. The shift in political 
power is relatively large. It might not be that easy for the opposition to persuade the winning coalition to 
defect. Defecting from the current leader means forgoing the privilege provided. Hence, we halve the 
drop in political power to 5% ( = 2.25). The result of the simulation based on the new benchmark is 




Figure 2.6 The joint utility with new benchmark 
By lowering the loss in political power when proceeding with the removal plan, we effectively 
make the execute option more attractive. The joint utili y now has positive values when the subsidy cut is 
approximately between 40% and 80%. It peaks around 63% before decreasing rapidly. The range 40-80% 
is when implementing the cut at those percentage makes both parties better off. The actual percentage cut 
depends on who has more bargaining power. However, th  percentage that gives the maximum joint 
utility is to implement a 63% cut of the subsidy. When we look at each party, we notice that the 63% cut 
is not where the government or the people are at the peak of their own utility. See Figure 2.7 and 2.8. The 
general population prefers a lower percentage while t e government prefers the opposite. The government 
is better off to remove the subsidy entirely while th people prefer it to be around 32% because a higher 
cut means an even lower expenditure level. 
 




Figure 2.8 The general population’s utility with new benchmark 
The last policy option is the possibility of the government giving a portion of the subsidy cut to 
the people as compensation. From the people’s perspective, the compensation is advantageous because 
the loss in purchasing power is reduced. The people exp rience a negligible impact on expenditure and 
still gain political power. As for the government, it lowers the savings generated from the subsidy cut. 
Therefore, the government receives a small gain from the savings generated but a big drop in political 
power. We predict that the government is the loser in this case. We simulate Equation (2.11) based on the 
new benchmark ( = 2.25) with different percentage values of compensation. The results are shown in 
Figure 2.9. We can clearly see that the best strategy is back to abandoning the plan when the portion of 
compensation is large. Even though the gain in removing the subsidy is sufficiently large for the people, 
the government is experiencing losses in utility. If the compensation is a relatively small percentage of the 
subsidy cut, the equilibrium strategy is to proceed with a large subsidy cut. In fact, at 30% compensation 
of the subsidy budget (r = 0.3), the equilibrium strategy is to lift the subidy. We know that the general 
population is always better off and thus, the joint utility depends on the government’s utility change. At a 
high percentage subsidy cut, the increase in expenditure for the government is actually big enough to 
outweigh the loss in political power. That is the reason that the joint utility started off decreasing but 
eventually increases as the percentage cut gets higher. For r = 0.1, the joint utility peaks at 65% and starts 
to decrease as the percentage cut increases because the compensation money is not big enough to keep up 




Figure 2.9 The joint utility with different compensation rate 
The percentage cut with the compensation policy is more effective if the government’s goal is to 
eliminate the subsidy. Our simulation shows that the percentage cut policy results in an optimal strategy 
of a 63% subsidy cut, while the percentage cut withcompensation policy results in lifting the subsidy 
using a 30% compensation ratio. In the case of Iran, the compensation ratio was about half of the savings 
with a targeted domestic price to cover at least 90% of the Persian Gulf price (Farzin et al. 2011). Under 
our simulation, a 50% compensation rate results in an optimal strategy of abandoning the subsidy cut. 
Hence, this suggests that the government of Iran has more concerns about income generated than 
simulated above. 
2.6 Sensitivity analyses 
Different governments may have different preferences. Since there has yet to be any work in the 
literature on government preferences, we perform a sensitivity analyses that examine the effects of the 
government’s and also the general population’s preference. One of the parameters will be given a range of 
values, while all else will be held constant at the new benchmark levels. The simulations use the 
percentage cut policy because we want to isolate the ffect of preferences. Since different preference 
parameters result in different levels of utility, we levelized them at 1, which appears as zero given th  
large scale on the Y axis.  Hence, we can illustrate the changes in terms of the magnitude with respect to 
different preference parameters.  
We started off with the general population’s prefernce. We predict that the people’s preferences 
lean towards their income. In our simulation, we look at a range of values of γ, that represents the 
people’s preference on expenditure, from 0.6 to 0.8 in 0.05 increments. The benchmark scenario is at γ = 
0.7. The results are illustrated in Figure 2.10. The joint utility for all γ values have a similar trend. It 
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started off decreasing until around a 15% subsidy cut. Afterwards, it increases gradually before reaching a 
peak and staring to decrease rapidly. The reason behi d the rapid decrease is because of the significatly 
higher income loss experienced by the general population. Additionally, notice that the optimal subsidy 
cut, which is the peak, decreases as the general popu ation puts a higher preference towards expenditure. 
For γ = 0.6, the optimal cut is at 75% while for γ = 0.8, the optimal cut drops to around 40%. In general, 
the equilibrium strategy is to cut a portion of the subsidy. However, as γ gets higher, that peak becomes 
really close to a utility level of 1 which means that the equilibrium is tilting towards abandoning the plan. 
 
Figure 2.10 Joint utility level with different values for people's preference on income (γ)  
It was previously mentioned that the cost of a subsidy policy is large and rising. Over time, we 
might expect the government to become more concerned a d realize the urgency. Therefore, the 
government might prefer to have extra funds for projects rather than keeping any excess political power. 
We test different values for , which represents the government’s preference on expenditure, from 0.5 to 
0.7 in 0.05 increments. The benchmark scenario is at  = 0.5. The results are illustrated in Figure 2.11 
below. 
Generally, the trend of the joint utility level is relatively similar to the previous sensitivity tests on 
γ. We can see that the joint utility started off decreasing and then starts to increase and reach a peak. As 
the subsidy cut gets higher, it starts to decrease r pidly. For  = 0.7, the joint utility peaks at around 45%. 
As for other values of , it follows a similar pattern but at a much lower utility level. The big difference 
in the sensitivity test on  is the magnitude of the changes. The scale for tests on γ is 1 × 10  as shown in 
Figure 10 while for tests on  it is 1 × 10  as shown in Figure 2.11. Since the government highly prefers 
its expenditure at  = 0.7, their utility level becomes significantly hig er with a large subsidy cut and 
thus, the joint utility also becomes higher. When the subsidy cut is so large that the general population is 
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actually worse off, the joint utility also becomes largely negative. Another takeaway is that at a high 
preference for extra funding, the gain in the joint utility from removing the subsidy is massive even with a 
smaller cut of 45%, compared to the benchmark at 63%. This is mainly driven by the substantial gain in 
the government’s utility. 
 
Figure 2.11 Joint utility level with values for government's preference on income ()
Based on our sensitivity analyses, the preferences of both the government and the general 
population have a significant impact on not only the optimal percentage cut of the subsidy, but also the 
magnitude of the change in utility level. Sensitivity tests on the government’s preference show a massive 
change in the utility levels because the gasoline subsidy is about 7% of the government’s overall 
expenditure. Meanwhile, gasoline consumption is only 3% of aggregate household consumption (Badan 
Pusat Statistik 2016c). 
2.7 Conclusion and further work 
Removing the gasoline subsidy is no easy task and the government should be vigilant before 
proceeding. The root of the difficulties arises because such action is met with strong resistance fromthe 
general population. Public protests could drop the government’s popularity and ultimately its political 
power, especially if it leads to violent protests and riots. While there are many studies that investigate the 
impact of subsidy removal, none has examined the difficulty faced by the government. This paper 
complements those studies by focusing on the decision-making process of the government when 
attempting to remove the gasoline subsidy. This paper lso contributes to the political power literatue by 
providing a mathematical framework for the governmet’s decision with influences from the general 
population. Despite the enormous political science literature on political power, we have found no similar 
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research. Our model also provides a framework for further research on government’s policy decision-
making. 
The model provides a structure on the problem faced by the government in trying to remove the 
gasoline subsidy, while still maintaining sufficient political power to stay in office. Furthermore, the 
simulations provide insights for the optimal government strategy. Under our benchmark scenario, the 
optimal strategy is to abandon the policy removal pl n. However, we found that the equilibrium is 
sensitive to the drop in popularity or political power of the government. With a relatively lower drop in 
political power, the government may find total subsidy removal to be the best policy. An effective 
educational campaign might help turn the tide, especially given the significant welfare gain for the 
economy by removing the subsidy. Different policy senarios also result in different optimal subsidy cuts. 
In addition, the preferences of the government and the general population play a major role in 
determining whether the government should move forward with the policy reform. If the people have 
strong preferences for keeping their income, removing the subsidy will be harder. For the case that the 
government is in strong need of extra funds, meaning that the government has a strong preference on 
revenues, the equilibrium could change. 
Despite the assumptions that were made and do not entirely reflect reality, our model and 
analyses still provide insights on the problems faced by the government. The leader should be consciou 
of the preference of the general population. In the case that the country is experiencing an economic 
downturn, continuing the policy reform might not be neficial. The people are more aware of their daily 
expenditures because of the current economic situation nd thus, a reform that could potentially lower 
their purchasing power is likely unacceptable. In our model, this will be the case where the utility of the 
general population will always be negative for any percentage cut of the subsidy because of a high         
γ-value on the people's preference for income. Another important takeaway is the drop in political power 
caused by the policy reform. Since the only winners are the leader along with winning coalition members, 
the reform is subject to strong rejection and also presents itself as an opportunity for the political 
opposition to garner some political power. During a period when the country is politically unstable or 
when some elite selectorate members are united to overthrow the current government, moving forward 
with the reform is risky. Given that these people have resources, they can cause a stir that would cause 
further instability. This might result in a higher drop of the political power index that exceeds the 
predicted value. The government’s perspective on how t e elite selectorate, and ultimately the general 
population, will react is of utmost importance. 
However, in recent years the price of crude oil has been very low. This is very beneficial for 
governments that provide a gasoline subsidy because it eff ctively gets rid of the subsidy without any 
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government intervention. This scenario is not included in the model, since we assume that a removal of 
the policy will always increase the price of gasoline n the domestic market. This period of time present  a 
great opportunity for these governments to remove the subsidy. However, given the volatility of the crude 
oil market, these governments might be forced to increase the price of gasoline in their domestic markets 
in the future. 
Further research could extend the model applied in this essay. There are assumptions that were 
made to simplify the model. Relaxing these assumptions could change the direction of the results. For 
example, the inflation resulting from the policy removal is ignored. It was assumed that the government 
has the necessary tools to tackle it. Inflation effectively lowers the purchasing power of the people and
thus, raises even further the price of gasoline along with other goods. Hence, any ensuing inflation will 
magnify the people's reduction in real expenditure. Furthermore, the impact of the penalty when the 
people take to the streets in protest is ignored because we assume that the government is able to dissua e 
them from doing so or at least cap the penalty to be negligible. This is certainly not the case, since there 
have been numerous public protests and riots suggestin  nontrivial losses. Furthermore, our model 
represents the case where the subsidy cut is below the threshold . Although we set the threshold at the 
maximum, the government is still facing difficulties in removing the subsidy. In reality, the governmet 
should decide on the subsidy based on the real threshold since the penalty will definitely lower the utility 
for both parties. Hence, the government can approach the subsidy removal issue by first conducting 
research to ensure that no penalty will take place. Next, the government can focus on preferences and the 
political power index to improve the accuracy of the result before implementing the policy.  
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CHAPTER 3  
ESTIMATING THE CROSS-PRICE ELASTICITY OF REGULAR GASOLINE WITH 
RESPECT TO THE PRICE OF PREMIUM GASOLINE 
3.1 Introduction 
Demand for gasoline is one of the most intensively r searched topics of energy economics. Many 
studies using different methods have been carried out to improve the accuracy of the findings. 
Interestingly, there has yet to be any studies that attempt to determine the substitutability between 
gasoline with different grades. Such knowledge is needed to be able to examine the inefficiency caused 
by a fuel pricing policy that has a different subsidy rate for different grades of gasoline. Most studies in 
the literature treat regular, midgrade and premium gasoline as a single market. We have found only two 
studies, Fullerton et al. (2015) using Mexican data and Hastings et al. (2013) using U.S. data, that 
consider regular and premium gasoline as separate poducts. However, neither attempts to estimate the 
cross-price elasticity. 
Logically, we would think that gasoline with different grades should have a high substitutability. 
Premium gasoline has a higher price only because of b tter quality. Biello (2015) found that a higher-
octane gasoline prevents knocking and helps the engin  last longer. Moreover, the miles per gallon rate is 
better under specific automobile conditions (Samanaitis 2012, Chu 2014). Other than performance, it 
seems that different grades of gasoline are relativly similar, and thus interchangeable. The rarity of 
studies that focus on regular and premium gasoline and their cross price elasticities probably results from 
a lack of detailed data. Even when the data exists, there is typically a high degree of collinearity between 
regular and premium gasoline prices rendering cross price elasticities undiscernible. For example, we 
found this to be the case when we attempted to use U.S. data as in Hastings et al. (2013). We found the 
correlation between the 2 prices to be 0.9994. Fortunately, we are able to apply our analysis to Mexican 
data as in Fullerton et al. (2015). Figure 3.1 depicts the historical real price of regular and premiu 
gasoline in Mexico, which we use in this essay. TheMexican government sets the price of gasoline every 
month to protect the poor from high fuel prices andto provide them with extra income (Plante and Jordan 
2013). Kojima (2013) stated that the retail gasoline price is decoupled from the world price and smoothed 
by the subsidy. Although we expect that the correlation could be small because the government sets the 
price, it is still relatively large with a correlation coefficient of 0.867. However, the correlation s not so 
large that we are unable to estimate a cross price elasticity of regular gasoline with respect to the price of 
premium. What is most interesting about the price pattern is the gradually increase in the difference from 




Figure 3.1 Real price of gasoline in Mexico (real 2008 pesos) 
Countries that subsidize gasoline may treat regular and premium gasoline as different products. 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Egypt deregulated prices for higher grade fuels and thus, only regular gasoline is 
subsidized by the government. Specifically for Indoesia, there was only one grade of gasoline until 2002 
and it was sold by the national oil company, Pertamin . Afterwards, a higher grade gasoline market was 
opened to foreign oil companies. The government decided not to provide any subsidy for the higher grade 
gasoline because it involved awarding subsidies to multinational companies. Another example is Mexico 
that implements price controls for regular and premium gasoline. According to a report, an increase in the 
price of regular gasoline does not necessarily mean an i crease in the price for premium gasoline 
(Yucatan 2016) suggesting the subsidies on the two products are different. 
The outcome of gasoline subsidy policy is inefficien y in both regular and premium gasoline 
markets. If the government were to implement a policy that only affected the price for a specific octane-
level of gasoline, the impact can only be determined accurately with knowledge of substitutability by 
grade. Neglecting the effect on the other market might prove costly since the inefficiency could be 
escalated. We are specifically interested in the unique case of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Egypt, becaus 
the government leaves the price of premium gasoline market to the world market price, while the price of 
regular gasoline is controlled. The correlation between the prices should be lower and thus, could 
arguably provide better estimates. However, Mexican g soline market data are used instead because of 
difficulties in obtaining all the necessary Indonesian data. Although our investigations convinced us the 
data do exist, we were never granted access despite a number of requests for it. 
The contribution of this essay is to build upon andimprove the one study we found (Fullerton et 
al. 2015) that estimates gasoline demand own-price elasticities by grade. We improve on their work by 
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specifically estimating both own and cross-price elasticities for regular gasoline. We are also able to 
increase the sample size and will perform much more substantive statistical testing including tests for 
structural change, adjustments for seasonality, and tests for stationarity and cointegration. Further, we test 
the assumption that the prices set by the government ar  exogenous because the government might 
respond to market conditions.  
In the next section, general formulas, the collected data, and its sources are discussed followed by 
stationarity tests in section 3.3. Stationary tests are necessary to tackle the issue of cointegration. Since 
not all variables are I(1), we use a more suitable Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model. We 
ended up with an unrestricted error correction model, which is a particular type of ARDL model. The 
model is examined in section 3.4. Next, we carry out tests for validity of the results, including 
autocorrelation, endogeneity and structural breaks. The tests results are discussed in section 3.5. In section 
3.6, we summarize the results for regular gasoline. W  also attempt to estimate the demand for premium 
gasoline in section 3.7. The essay is then concluded in section 3.8. 
3.2 General functions and data 
There have been numerous studies on gasoline demand using reduced form estimation. The 
models that are used extensively in those studies have dependent variables such as price of gasoline, pric  
of substitutes and income. Studies generally estimates the model based on per capita data with the most 
common functional form based on logged data. Therefore, the first model for reduced form estimation is 
as shown below. 
ln = + ln + ln + ln +      (3.1) 
Where Q is consumption per capita 
 P is real price of the good 
  is real price of a substitute 
Y is real income per capita 
Given the difficulties we find later with the above specification, we also posit a second reduced 
form estimation that does not use per capita data but rather includes population as a separate explanatory 
variable. In this case, the model is as shown in Equation (3.2). 
ln = + ln + ln + ln + ln +    (3.2) 
Where q is consumption level 
y is real income  
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 pop is population 
For both models, the elasticities are given by the co fficients because the data are in logarithms. 
The own-price elasticity is , while the cross-price and the income elasticity are given by  and  
respectively. Other less popular approaches use flexible functional forms such as the translog or linear 
logit. However, the authors' attempts in using either of these models were abandoned as the results defied 
economic intuition. 
Since we are interested in the unique case of Indonesia, we valiantly tried to get the gasoline 
consumption data for Indonesia’s gasoline market. However, the data are confidential and our attempts to 
retrieve them involved complicated bureaucratic procedures with no data forthcoming. However, the data
are readily available for the gasoline market in Mexico from the National Institute of Statistics and 
Geography of Mexico (INEGI 2016). Fortunately, Mexico is a country with some similar characteristics 
to Indonesia. Both countries have either all or the majority of their population in the tropics and thus, do 
not have extreme seasonal changes. Furthermore, the government controls the price of gasoline in the 
domestic market and has been subsidizing gasoline at least for the last decade (OGJ 2013). Both regular 
and premium gasoline are controlled by the government and they treat these goods differently (Yucatan 
Times 2016).   
The gasoline consumption data are separated into two groups: regular gasoline and premium 
gasoline with monthly figures from January 1999 to December 2014 in thousands of barrels per day as 
shown in Figure 3.2. The data from INEGI is the nominal price and we convert it into real price using 
Mexico’s consumer price index data from the FRED datab se (Federal Reserve Economic Data 2016). 
Most of gasoline consumption is for regular gasoline. The consumption level for both gasolines is 
relatively stable until around 2007, where we can see ome kind of substitution. We predict that this is 
due to a bigger gap between the prices as shown in Figure 3.1 above. 
In 2006, the price of WTI reached $70/barrel. The government of Mexico probably set a higher 
price of premium gasoline to compensate for the spike in the price of crude oil. Consumption of regular 
increased significantly while premium sales dropped until around 2011, when consumption steadily went 
back to the previous levels as the gap between the pric of regular and premium gasoline was reduced. 
Therefore, we suspect that there is strong substitutability among the two grades of gasoline. However, 
there is also a period of global recession in 2009 that affected income. The significant decrease in income 
might also drive that substitution. In addition, notice that there seems to be a spike every year for regular 
gasoline. By examining the data, that significant increase in consumption always occur in December. This 
may occur because families gather together from all over the country during Christmas or because 
Mexico’s warm climate attracts a lot of tourists at the end of the year. Therefore, we include a dummy for 
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the month of December to handle seasonality. We also tested for other months but found no other 
statistically significant seasonality in the data. 
 
Figure 3.2 Gasoline consumption level in Mexico 
Gasoline consumption per capita is shown in Figure 3.3. There is no noticeable difference in the 
trends between level consumption shown in Figure 3.2 and per capita. 
 
Figure 3.3 Gasoline consumption per capita 
Figure 3.4 depicts the historical real GDP that has been linearly interpolated because consumption 
and price data are monthly, while the GDP is quarterly. The GDP is in local currency units, pesos. The
effect of the 2009 global recession is clearly shown as the real GDP of Mexico experienced a significant 
drop in 2009. Since 2000, the GDP had been steadily increasing before the recession dropped it back to 
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around 2006’s level as illustrated in Figure 3.3. Based on the data, there is a possibility of a structu al 
change because of the recession, which we consider in t sts of the model. 
 
Figure 3.4 Real GDP 
GDP per capita is shown in Figure 3.5. The real GDP per capita data is relatively similar to the 
GDP. 
 
Figure 3.5 Mexico’s real GDP per capita  
For both Equations (3.1) and (3.2) population data is necessary. Similar to the GDP data, linear 
interpolation was carried out to convert the quarterly data into monthly data. The quarterly population 
data is retrieved from INEGI and is shown in Figure 3.4. The population data is used to get the 





Figure 3.6 Mexican population 
3.3 Stationarity tests 
In order to choose the most suitable model, stationr ty test are first performed on the variables. If 
variables are non-stationary, there is a possibility of spurious regression. By looking at the data from 
Figure 3.1 to 3.6 above, we can clearly see that income, prices, and population appear to be non-
stationary. We perform augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests on all variables in Equations (3.1) and
(3.2), and also their first difference, to confirm our prediction. The results are shown in Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1 Augmented Dickey Fuller test on variables 
ADF test 
 test statistics order 
ln Q  -2.685* I(0) 
ln P   6.128 I(1) 
ln P   1.976 I(1) 
ln Y  -0.489 I(1) 
ln q -2.099 I(1) 
ln y -0.040 I(1) 
ln pop -1.864 I(1) ∆ln Q  -24.594** I(0) ∆ln P   -6.375** I(0) ∆ln P   -10.813** I(0) ∆ ln Y  -7.774** I(0) ∆ln q -24.591** I(0) ∆ln y -7.789** I(0) ∆ln pop -1.491** I(0) 
*, ** means significant at 10%, 5% and 1% 
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It turns out that we reject the null hypothesis that regular gasoline consumption per capita has a 
unit root. The results show that for the first model (Equation (3.1)) there is a mixture of I(0) and I(1) 
regressors, while the second model is purely I(1). Consequently, we are restricted to an ARDL model, 
which can handle a mixture of I(0) and I(1) regressor  (Pesaran et al. 2001), for the per capita model. As 
for the consumption level model, we have options such as ARDL and the error correction model (ECM), 
which we explore further. 
3.4 Autoregressive distributive lag (ARDL) 
We use an ARDL model to estimate the gasoline demand per capita model based on the work of 
Pesaran et. al (1998). The general ARDL(p,q) model is as shown in Equation (3.4) below. 
= + + ∑ + + ∑ ∗ Δ +   (3.4) Δ = Δ + Δ +  .  .  .+  Δ +   
Where  is the k-dimensional I(1) variables that are not cointegrated among themselves,  and 
 are serially uncorrelated disturbances with zero means and constant variance-covariances, and  are 
 x  coefficient matrices such that the vector autoregressive process Δ  is stable. 
In order to have a proper ARDL model, we have to find the optimal lag length for each variable. 
A modified Dickey-Fuller t test (also called DF-GLS) proposed by Elliott et al. (1996) is performed. The 
results for both the first and second model variables are shown in Table 3.2. Stata reports that the optimal 
lag length varies based on three criterion methods; Ng-Perron sequential t (Ng and Perron 1995), 
minimum Schwarz information criterion (Schwarz 1978), and modified Akaike information criterion (Ng 
and Perron 2001). Another important check is that tere must be no autocorrelation in the errors.  
Table 3.2 DF-GLS test results 
DF-GLS Optimal lag 
 
Ng-Perron SC MAIC 
ln Q  14 14 14 
ln q  14 14 14 
ln P   13 1 13 
ln P   11 1 1 
ln Y  13 10 13 
ln y  13 10 13 
ln pop  13 1 1 
Based on trial-and-error, the authors could not find a y ARDL model without serial correlation, 
which may be caused by a stationary dependent variable while the explanatory variables are non-
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stationary. Given this problem, we disregard the gasoline demand per capita and move on with Equation 
(3.2) in levels. 
The ARDL model chosen is the unrestricted ECM (Pesaran et al. 2001). The model without serial 
correlation with the best fit was chosen based on the adjusted R2 values. This model is an 
ARDL(14,13,1,10,1) as shown in  Equation (3.5). Since the interpolation of population produced perfect 
collinearity in differenced population, we were only able to include one lag in the estimation. 
       Δ ln = + ∑ Δ ln + γΔ ln + ∑ Δ ln + ∑ ∆ln +
+ θΔ ln + ln + ln + ln + ln +
ln + +        (3.5) 
Next, we test for cointegration by performing the bounds test as proposed by Pesaran et al. (2001) 
on Equation (3.5). The null hypothesis that there is no level relationship ( = = = = = 0) 
is tested using the F statistic from the bounds test. If the test-statistic is greater than the critical F value 
and the errors for the equation are not serially correlated, the null hypothesis of no levels relationship is 
rejected. We reject the null at the 2.5% significance level by F-test statistics result, which means that here 
is a long run equilibrium in the model and thus, the model has cointegration. The results are shown in 
Table 3.3.  
Table 3.3 ARDL bounds test result 
 : no levels relationship 
F- test statistics   4.959 
Probability 0.100 0.050 0.025 0.010 
 
I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
critical values 2.72 3.77 3.23 4.35 3.69 4.89 4.29 5.61 
t- test statistics   -3.668 
Probability 0.100 0.050 0.025 0.010 
 I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
critical values -2.57 -3.66 -2.86 -3.99 -3.13 -4.26 -3.43 -4.60 
Note: the null hypothesis is rejected if F > I(1) criti al value, accepted if F < I(0) critical value. For the t-
statistic, the null hypothesis is rejected if t > I(1) critical value, accepted if t < I(0) critical value. 
3.5 Tests for validity of ARDL model estimation 
Before we can confirm the validity of the results, we perform tests for autocorrelation based on an 
alternate Durbin test (Durbin 1970) and Breusch-Godfrey test (Godfrey 1978). We also check the errors 
for autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) proposed by Engle (1982). The null hypothesis 
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of no ARCH disturbances cannot be rejected. In addition, the RESET test (Ramsey 1969) was carried out 
to check for misspecification but found none. These t ts results are shown in Table 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6. 
Table 3.4 Test results for autocorrelation 
H  : no autocorrelation chi  Prob > chi  
Durbin's Alternative test 0.456 0.4993 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test 0.613 0.4336 
 
Table 3.5 Test result for ARCH 
 : no ARCH disturbance chi  Prob > chi  
LM test for ARCH 0.608 0.4357 
 
Table 3.6 Test for misspecification 
 : no misspecification F Prob > F 
Ramsey RESET test 0.880 0.4541 
 
 
The ARDL model relies on the fact that the governmet of Mexico is controlling the price of 
regular and premium gasoline and thus, we assume that these prices are exogenous. This makes economic 
sense because 40% of domestic gasoline consumption is imported (Kojima 2013, EIA 2016b) and the 
Mexican gasoline market is only about 3.2% of world market gasoline (EIA 2016b). Thus, we think it is a 
stretch to say that the Mexican gasoline market affcts the world market price for gasoline and favor the 
conclusion that Mexican gasoline prices are exogenous. 
However, Plante et al. (2013) noted that the goal of the price control is to protect vulnerable 
groups in society, such as the poor, from high fuelprices or to provide them with extra income. While 
Kojima (2013) reports that the retail price in Mexico is decoupled from world price movements and 
smoothed by adjusting the subsidy. Thus, if the government considers the current market conditions in 
deciding the prices and not just the world price, th se prices might, indeed, be endogenous and we should 
abandon the ARDL model in favor of two or three-stage least squares.  
The issue of endogeneity arises from simultaneity, which can bias OLS estimates. Specifically, it 
can be present if errors in demand move us along the domestic supply of gasoline and generate a price 
change passed on by the regulators or if errors in demand influence the subsidy set by the regulator. In 
these cases, the regular and premium gasoline prices set by the government are endogenous and thus, the 
variables from the supply equation should be used a instruments for the prices to eliminate asymptotic 
bias. Gasoline is supplied by refineries and thus te model consists of input cost and the performance of 
refineries. Therefore, the supply function will have refinery acquisition cost for crude oil and refinry 
utilization capacity. However, INEGI does not provide these data. The closest we can get to estimate 
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these data is based on US refinery data. These data are retrieved from EIA (2016a) and converted to pesos 
using exchange rates from the FRED database (2016). 
The tests for endogeneity are performed based on the Hausman-Wu method (Hausman 1978, Wu 
1974) and the Durbin test (1954). Staiger et al. (1997) found that the Durbin test is recommended when 
the instruments are weak. Since we are testing the ARDL model, the instruments for the prices are the 
first difference prices with the optimal lags as well as refinery acquisition cost and utilization. The null 
hypothesis is that the price variables in question are exogenous. The results are shown in Table 8. The test 
statistics for both methods are low with p values well away from significant levels, which means that we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity. Given our preconceived expectation and these test resul s, 
we conclude that both price of regular and premium gasoline are exogenous and proceed with the ARDL 
model results. As exogeneity tests are weak in power,  put the results from the 2-stage least squares 
estimates in the appendix for the interested reader. 
Table 3.7 Exogeneity test results 
 : variables tested are exogenous 
 
Durbin ( ℎ ) Wu-Hausman (F) 
 test statistics p test statistics p 
joint ln & ln  1.101 0.5767 0.408 0.6661 
*, ** means significant at 5% and 1% 
 
When we discussed the data, we noted the potential for  structural break. The global financial 
crisis in 2008 had an impact on income, which could have altered consumption patterns. We might also 
expect an asymmetric response to income increases than to income decreases. The widening price 
differential between regular and premium that happened between 2004 and 2012 is also worthy of some 
additional testing. 
We check for structural breaks by performing CUSUM and CUSUM-square tests. If the model 
stays within the deviation range, we can conclude that there is no structural break in the model. The 
results of the CUSUM and CUSUM-square tests confirm that there is no structural change in the variables 




Figure 3.7 CUSUM test 
 




























Although the CUSUM tests reject the existence of any structural breaks, the model is very close 
to crossing the deviation range in July 2009 as shown in Figure 3.7. In addition, we can see that the 
deviation from October 2006 to December 2012 is significantly larger. We predict that the larger gap 
between the prices is the reason behind this phenomn. We will include the tests for structural breaks in 
our estimation results in the next section. 
3.6 Estimation results 
Our model was estimated using Stata with the results hown in Table 3.8. The long run own-price 
elasticity of regular gasoline is -1.91, which is quite elastic, while the cross-price elasticity with respect to 
premium is 0.895. This result supports the expectation of high substitutability among gasolines of 
different grades. The long run income elasticity is found to be 0.73. Another important takeaway is that
only the coefficient for income is significant in the short run (one month) suggesting that people hav
more accurate expectations of income than of price changes and may adjust faster to income changes. Th 
fact that the short run income elasticity is larger than the long run, however, suggests some caution is 
needed. A high correlation between income and population (0.97) and the high elasticity for long run 
population suggests that the population variable may be picking up some of the long income effect. 
Meanwhile the short run one month elasticity is considerably higher than our expectations. 
Table 3.8 Unrestricted ECM results 
 coefficient se 
ln q (η4)   
(adjustment factor) -0.268** (0.0730) 
Long run 
ln P  (-η / η ) -1.910** (0.3100) 
ln P  (-η / η ) 0.895* (0.4564) 
ln y (η / η ) 0.727* (0.3409) 
ln pop 2.524** (0.5555) 
Short run 
ln P   0.467 (0.6403) 
ln P   -0.383 (0.3348) 
ln y  1.161** (0.4303) 
ln pop 45.623 (34.249) 
D   0.055** (0.0106) 
Adj R  0.853 
RMSE 0.0175 




We also consider cases of a structural break. First, we consider the recession effect. The 2008 
crisis has been often compared with the Great Depression in 1930. Ben Bernanke claimed it was actually 
worse than the Great Depression (Worstall 2014). Consequently, there might be a case that there is a 
change in how income is perceived when income drops. Two dummy variables for the time period after 
recession ( ) and income effect (  ) are introduced.  = 1 after December 
2008, while   = GDP every time GDP decreases compared to the previous month. The 
dummy income drop is interacted with income to determine whether there is any significant change in 
income elasticity. The results for each scenario are shown in the table below. 
Table 3.9 Summary of ARDL results with income hypothesis 
 No break Time effect break Income interaction 
 coefficient se coefficient se coefficient se 
ln  -0.268** (0.0730) -0.290** (0.0915) -0.245** (0.0770) 
Long run 
ln P   -1.910** (0.3100) -1.807** (0.3631) -2.000** (0.3694) 
ln P   0.895* (0.4564) 0.903* (0.4246) 1.030 (0.5475) 
ln   0.727* (0.3409) 0.738* (0.3173) 0.707 (0.3729) 
ln  2.524** (0.5555) 2.336** (0.6873) 2.450** (0.6227) 
Short run 
ln P   0.467 (0.6403) 0.489 (0.6392) 0.382 (0.6470) 
ln P   -0.383 (0.3348) -0.391 (0.3383) -0.282 (0.3516) 
ln   1.161** (0.4303) 1.270** (0.4334) 1.459** (0.4904) 
ln  45.623 (34.249) 49.520 (35.697) 41.320 (34.570) 
  0.055** (0.0106) 0.055** (0.0106) 0.056** (0.0106) 
 - - 0.004 (0.0102) - - 
  - - - - 0.000 (0.0004) 
Adj R  0.852 0.852 0.853 
RMSE 0.0175 0.0175 0.0175 
*, ** means significant at 5% and 1% 
 
The results show that the dummy variables in each model are statistically insignificant. Overall, 
we reject the existence of a change in the gasoline co sumption pattern after the recession or for an 
asymmetric response to changes in income. Nor do the elasticity estimates change much with the addition 
of the dummy variables.  
Next, we test for the bigger gap between the prices as the price of premium gasoline gradually 
increased since 2004 while price of regular stayed relatively constant until 2010. Based on the result of 
the CUSUM test, we add two dummy variables that turn on between October 2006 and December 2012. 
  for the period of large price gap and   that is interacted with the price of premium 
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gasoline.   = 1 from October 2006 to December 2012, while   = price of premium 
within the period. 
Table 3.10 Summary of ARDL results with price gap hy othesis 
 No break Price gap break 
Premium price 
interaction 
 coefficient se coefficient se coefficient se 
ln  -0.268** (0.0730) -0.347** (0.0886) -0.348** (0.0770) 
Long run 
ln P   -1.910** (0.3100) -1.651** (0.2494) -1.651** (0.2478) 
ln P   0.895* (0.4564) 0.747* (0.3409) 0.749* (0.3392) 
ln   0.727* (0.3409) 0.632* (0.2639) 0.630* (0.2629) 
ln  2.524** (0.5555) 2.432** (0.4366) 2.431** (0.4347) 
Short run 
ln P   0.467 (0.6403) 0.536 (0.6384) 0.539 (0.6384) 
ln P   -0.383 (0.3348) -0.433 (0.3345) -0.434 (0.3345) 
ln   1.161** (0.4303) 1.094** (0.4427) 1.094* (0.4423) 
ln  45.623 (34.249) 29.088 (35.674) 28.952 (35.659) 
  0.055** (0.0106) 0.054** (0.0106) 0.056** (0.0106) 
  - - 0.012 (0.0078) - - 
  - - - - 0.006 (0.0035) 
Adj R  0.852 0.855 0.855 
RMSE 0.0175 0.0174 0.0174 
*, ** means significant at 5% and 1% 
 
Similarly, the results show that the dummy variables in each model are statistically insignificant. 
Overall, we reject the existence of a change in gasoline consumption during this time period because of 
larger price gap. The elasticities estimates are also relatively similar though less elastic.  
Based on the significance of the explanatory variables, we conclude that the best model is the one 
without any additional dummy variables. The long run own-price elasticity is -1.91, while the cross-price 
elasticity is 0.895. This confirms our hypothesis that there is strong substitutability between regular and 
premium gasoline. Meanwhile, the income elasticity is estimated to be 0.73 but remains uncertain. 
3.7 Premium gasoline 
We apply the estimation approach to premium gasoline as well. The dependent variable is 
premium gasoline consumption with the independent variables exactly the same as in Equation (3.2). The 
optimal lag length for sales of premium gasoline turns out to be similar as well. The resulting model is 




Table 3.11 Estimation results for premium gasoline 
 coefficient se 




ln P  (-η / η ) 35.872 (21.261) 
ln P  (-η / η ) -52.320 (32.316) 
ln y (η / η ) 22.664 (13.678) 
ln pop -22.010 (18.927) 
Short run 
ln P   -0.031 (1.1180) 
ln P   -1.487* (0.5947) 
ln y  0.452 (0.8895) 
ln pop -0.584 (0.4234) 
D   0.046* (0.0205) 
Adj R  0.761 
RMSE 0.0303 
*, ** means significant at 5% and 1% 
 
 
The residuals are checked for autocorrelation, misspecification and ARCH disturbances but no 
problems are found. The test results are shown in Table 3.12. 
Table 3.12 Test results for validity of estimation results 
H  : no autocorrelation chi  Prob > chi  
Durbin's Alternative test 0.162 0.6877 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test 0.241 0.6232 
H  : no ARCH disturbance chi  Prob > chi  
LM test for ARCH 1.339 0.2473 
H  : no misspecification F Prob > F 
Ramsey RESET test 0.480 0.6954 
 
 
The validity of the results are confirmed statistically, yet the estimation results raise questions. 
When we look at the bounds test result in Table 13, the null hypothesis that there is no level relationship 
is not rejected for both F-test and t-test. This means we do not find that consumers of premium gasoline 
respond to changes in gasoline prices or income in the long-run, but somewhat puzzlingly, they respond 
in the short-run to fluctuations in the premium gasoline price. We throw out two possibilities to these 
results. If premium gasoline consumers have high incomes and gasoline expenditure is a very small share 
of their budget, then price and income changes may truly have little effect on their consumption patterns. 
However, some premium gasoline consumers on the margin may be very conscious of their expenditures 
and treat premium gasoline as a luxury. Therefore, when the price increases or decreases, they react 
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immediately by changing their consumption of the two fuels. Neither of these explanations is totally 
satisfying and we urge further work to see if more convincing explanations and estimates can be obtained.  
Table 3.13 Bounds test for premium gasoline estimation 
 : no levels relationship 
F- test statistics   2.633 
Probability 0.100 0.050 0.025 0.010 
 
I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
critical values 2.45 3.52 2.86 4.01 3.25 4.49 3.74 5.06 
t- test statistics   -1.526 
Probability 0.100 0.050 0.025 0.010 
 I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
critical values -2.57 -3.66 -2.86 -3.99 -3.13 -4.26 -3.43 -4.60 
Note: the null hypothesis is rejected if F > I(1) criti al value, accepted if F < I(0) critical value. For the t-
statistic, the null hypothesis is rejected if t > I(1) critical value, accepted if t < I(0) critical value. 
3.8 Conclusion 
This paper examines the elasticities of demand for regular gasoline with premium gasoline as a 
potential substitute. There is a very limited literature that closely investigates gasoline with different 
grades. Building upon previous work by Fullerton et al. (2015) on regular and premium gasoline demand 
in Mexico, improvements were made that includes tests for stationarity, cointegration and structural 
breaks. The range of the data is also longer for better accuracy. Furthermore, the possibility that the prices 
of gasoline with different grades are endogenous was tested along with structural breaks.  
We considered two models. In the first model, per capita gasoline demand, population was used 
to create per capita income and per capita gasoline co sumption. In the second model with gasoline 
consumption levels, population was entered separately. The ARDL model was chosen for the per capita 
model because the dependent variable, regular gasoline consumption per capita, was found to be 
stationary, while gasoline prices and income per capita were found to be I(1). However, we could not find 
any model deemed statistically satisfactory for the per capita specification. We then moved to the levls 
model where all variables are I(1), where we had better luck. An ARDL(14,13,1,10, 1), commonly known 
as an unrestricted ECM, was chosen because of higher adjusted  value and it passed all necessary tests 
such as no autocorrelation, no ARCH disturbance, and no misspecification. Structural breaks related to 
income and prices, as well as exogeneity of gasoline prices were also tested and the results confirmed the 
validity of the estimates.   
Elasticity values for own-, cross-price, population, a d income in the long run for regular 
gasoline are found to be -1.91, 0.895, and 0.73, respectively. The resulting cross-price elasticity confirms 
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our expectation for the relationship between regular and premium gasoline. Thus, an increase in the pric  
for premium can substantially shift consumers’ consumption pattern towards regular gasoline. In the case 
of the short-run, none of the price elasticities are statistically significant. This is expected since gasoline 
has few substitutes and consumers do not have enough time to respond. Meanwhile, income elasticity is 
found to be statistically significant. Since the short run income elasticity is larger than the long run, 
caution is needed in interpreting the estimation results. Other studies on aggregate gasoline demand 
suggest that the short run elasticity may be too large nd the long run elasticity may be too small. A high 
correlation between income and population (0.97) and the high elasticity for long run population (>2) 
suggests that the population variable may be picking up some of the long income effect.  
Our results confirm that consumers of regular gasoline in Mexico are quite responsive to changes 
in the price of premium. However, attempts to estima e meaningful demand elasticities for premium 
gasoline were unsuccessful. There may be a core group of wealthy users of premium that are unlikely to 
alter their consumption based on prices and the overall changes in Mexican GDP and population. Or the 




CHAPTER 4  
SIMULATION OF PRICE CONTROLS FOR DIFFERENT GRADES OF GASOLINE:  
THE CASE OF INDONESIA 
4.1 Introduction 
The essence of the gasoline subsidy policy problem is its inefficiency. The policy leads to 
overconsumption of gasoline since a subsidy drives consumers to purchase a good at a price that is 
cheaper than the cost of producing it (Harvey and Gayer 2013). In the case of Indonesia, the problem is 
further aggravated by the fact that the government only provides a subsidy for regular gasoline, the lowest 
grade gasoline. Malaysia and Egypt implemented a similar policy that deregulates the higher grade of 
gasoline (Kojima 2013). Indonesia started off in the 1960s with only the national oil company, Pertamina, 
allowed in the domestic gasoline market and gasoline was subsidized as a way to protect people from the 
effects of inflation (Beaton and Lonton 2010). In 2001, a new regulation was introduced by the 
government that opened up the domestic gasoline market to multinational oil companies but only for 
high-octane gasoline. This was done to combat the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Regular gasoline was left 
subsidized. Such a scheme violates Ramsey’s tax rule that taxing rival commodities should leave the 
consumer’s relative choices unaltered (Ramsey 1927). Different tax rates on commodities and factors 
introduce a distortion between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal rate of transformation 
(Stiglitz and Dasgupta 1971). In addition, Ito and Sallee (2014) found that taxation based on different 
characteristics of automobiles caused distortions in that market. Similarly, the Indonesian subsidy policy 
distorts both the regular and premium grade gasoline market. Another issue is the unequal benefit of the 
policy (del Granado et al. 2012). As consumers purchase more regular gasoline, the government’s 
expenditure on the subsidy increases significantly while income distribution is distorted as high-income 
consumers that purchase a higher amount of regular asoline, receive more benefit (Pradiptyo and 
Sahadewo 2012). 
An obvious exit strategy is to eliminate the subsidy. However, the government is reluctant to take 
this option because of its anticipated impact on consumer’s welfare and the political repercussions. A lot 
of studies have been done to analyze the economic impact of phasing out a gasoline subsidy in Indonesia. 
Adam and Lestari (2008) estimated that an increase in the price of oil correlates negatively with 
households’ welfare. Clements et al. (2007) showed that removing the subsidy increases aggregate price
levels and reduces real output, while Dartanto (2013) found that there will be an increase of poverty. 
Arguably, these outcomes might agitate the people and c use a significant drop in the government’s 
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popularity. Furthermore, a well-known economist in Indonesia said that removing the gasoline subsidy i 
against the constitution of Indonesia (Gie 2011). 
The fuel subsidy took about 15% of overall governmet expenditure in 2014 as shown in Figure 
1.1. It amounts to about 250 trillion rupiahs or around 20 billion USD (1 USD = Rp 12,000). Based on 
Indonesia’s annual state budget, more than 80% is for gasoline, diesel and kerosene with gasoline being 
the highest portion.  The government is aware of the large cost of the policy but it has remained hesitant 
to act because of the risk of being overthrown by the political opposition and strong public resistance. 
Numerous times the government has tried to cut the subsidy but retreated when met with public protests 
(Quiano 2012, Cochrane 2013). 
Another alternative is to reduce the distortion in the regular gasoline market while leaving the 
subsidy intact. Using Ramsey’s rule, the government should aim to steer the consumer’s choice back to a 
non-subsidy pattern. We show this can be achieved by decreasing the price of premium gasoline, which 
means that the government should also subsidize premium gasoline. However, if the new subsidy on 
premium gasoline is at the same rate as the current subsidy on regular gasoline, the government’s 
expenditure will increase significantly. Thus, the rate of the new subsidy has to be lower than the current 
subsidy but large enough to generate savings for the government.  
We have not found other studies that consider the rev nue or welfare effects of this somewhat 
counter intuitive policy. Thus, the contribution of this paper is to analyze this unique policy with a smaller 
subsidy for premium gasoline that could potentially reduce gasoline subsidy expenditures without the 
political backlash. Arguably, subsidy reform is difficult to enact because of the effect on purchasing 
power of the people and the resulting political instability. By implementing a different pricing policy for 
different grades of gasoline, the issue of inflation and political instability can be avoided.  
The chosen subsidy rate will depend on the elasticities of demand for gasoline. We predict that 
the substitutability of gasolines with different grades is what drives the magnitude of the savings. 
However, we have found no literature on the own and cross-price elasticity for regular and premium 
gasoline for Indonesia. Nor were our attempts to obtain Indonesian data successful. Therefore, we set up a 
simulation experiment with differential subsidies for premium gasoline by benchmarking to Indonesian 
data using the elasticities estimated in Essay 2 for Mexico, to our knowledge the only existing study on 
the cross-price elasticity of gasoline by grade. We assume that the market has a perfectly elastic supply 
and only consumer welfare is analyzed. Various simulations using different values for cross-price 
elasticity are done to determine whether there are cross-price elasticities that generate savings. Also, it has 
to be noted that the new subsidy will distort the pr mium gasoline market. There will be a welfare effct 
in both the regular and premium gasoline market.  
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In the next section, we present the mathematical model t  prove the existence of a potential 
reduction in gasoline subsidy expenditure by implementing a subsidy on premium gasoline. In section 
4.3, the data is presented followed in section 4.4 by the process in Rutherford (2002) , which uses a 
translog unit cost function to calibrate the derived demand functions. The necessary parameters for 
calibration are then presented in section 4.5. The parameters such as prices and share expenditures are 
based on Indonesia’s gasoline market, while the basline elasticity values are based on the estimated 
results in Akimaya (2016). The simulations for government spending based on benchmark values of 
elasticities are discussed further in section 4.6. However, given the high degree of uncertainty in the 
values of the parameters chosen, sensitivity analyses are performed with inputs from studies that include 
substitutes for gasoline (i.e. diesel fuel and ethanol). These tests are presented in section 4.7. Since the 
new subsidy policy introduces a new distortion in both markets, the welfare effects on consumers are 
analyzed in section 4.8 and the paper is concluded in section 4.9.  
4.2 Mathematical model 
In Indonesia there are three octane levels of gasoline: 83, 87 and 90. However, only the lowest 
octane level of gasoline, 83-octane, is subsidized, while the rest are kept at the world market price. For 
simplicity, we categorize gasoline into two groups, regular gasoline that is subsidized (83-octane) and 
premium gasoline that is unsubsidized (87-octane and above). In this paper, we will use the terms “regular 
gasoline” and “83-octane” interchangeably, as well as “premium gasoline” and “87-octane”. Since we 
want to leave the price of regular gasoline intact, the government is left with a subsidy on premium 
gasoline in an attempt to steer aggregate consumption behavior. If enough consumers switch away from 
the highly-subsidize 83-octane, the government’s expenditure on gasoline subsidies will be reduced. The 
government’s then can satisfy its main goal of generating savings to fund other projects.  
We know from the Slutsky equation that a change in price leads to an income and a substitution 
effect (Nicholson and Snyder 2011). By lowering the price of premium gasoline, we expect that there will 
be a change in the consumption bundle of gasoline by grade. The substitution effect by which consumers 
of regular gasoline decide to purchase premium gasoline may be beneficial to the government’s objective. 
For every unit of 83-octane being substituted with 87-octane, the government receives savings that equal 
the difference in the subsidy rate. However, it must be noted that the newly introduced subsidy results in 
additional government expenditure because premium gasoline consumption increases. The government 
has to ensure that the saving generated by the substitution effect is larger than the income effect that 
causes an additional expenditure on previously unsubsidized premium gasoline. Therefore, we predict tha
the substitutability between the gasolines (i.e., the cross-price elasticity) will play a major role in 
determining the existence of potential savings.  
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In our model, the objective of the government is to minimize its expenditure on the gasoline 
subsidy (G). The amount of the subsidy is given by total consumption of each gasoline multiplied by the 
rate of subsidy (s1 for regular and s2 for premium). The demand for each gasoline depends o  its own-
price, the price of the other grade, as well as income. We also include the price of all other goods (AOG) 
in the demand function because the income effect resulted from lowering the price of premium gasoline 
can be spent on goods other than gasoline. The demand for regular gasoline is denoted by , while for 
premium gasoline it is denoted by . The objective of the government is shown in Equation (4.1). 
min = +      (4.1) 
= ( ( ) , ( ) , , )  
= ( ( ) , ( ) , , )  
The first order condition gives us: 
= + + = 0 
The second order condition is: 
= + ×  
We can solve for the optimal subsidy rate on premium gasoline using the first order condition. 
The result shows that the optimal rate depends on how consumption on each gasoline changes with the 
introduction of the subsidy and the initial sales of premium gasoline. Since an increase in the amount f 
subsidy on premium gasoline equals the price change for a perfectly elastic supply, we know that 
= − . The first order condition becomes: 
= − − + = 0 
Multiply the first two expressions in the first order condition by : 
= − − + = 0 
We can now write the above equation in terms of cross and own price elasticities as follows:  
= − Ε( , ) − Ε + = 0 
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Solving for the optimal subsidy on premium yields:  
∗ = − 1Ε(83,87) 8387+ 87Ε87 87
87
     (4.2) 
Where: Ε( , )  is the cross-price elasticity of regular with respct to the price of premium  
 Ε  is the own-price elasticity of premium gasoline 
Equation (4.2) shows that the cross-price elasticity s a factor that affects the optimal value of the 
subsidy as well as the own-price elasticity of premium gasoline. Since the gasolines are substitute 
(Ε( , ) > 0), when the consumption of premium gasoline is extremely low, the optimal subsidy rate 
should be positive. In Indonesia, gasoline consumption is leaning heavily towards regular gasoline 
because of the significantly cheaper price. See Table 4.1. Hence, the optimal rate of subsidy for premium 
gasoline should be greater than zero. 
However, Equation (4.2) does not provide a closed form solution for the optimal rate of subsidy. 
The consumption of 83-octane and 87-octane are still in functional form. An increase in the subsidy will 
lower the price of premium gasoline, which in turn increases the consumption of premium gasoline. 
Therefore, without any further knowledge on the demand system for both regular and premium gasoline, 
we cannot use it to find the optimal rate of subsidy. Therefore, the next step is to determine the demand 
system for the gasolines. 
A seminal research paper by Christensen et al. (1973) gave rise to a flexible functional form for 
production functions called the translog. Christensen et al. (1975) also developed a more complicated 
translog model for utility. The logical choice is to use the model for utility. However, under a specific set 
of assumptions, both approaches result in an identical calibrated model. In our model, three goods will be 
included: regular gasoline, premium gasoline and all other goods (AOG). The lower price of premium 
gasoline after the subsidy means that people who have been purchasing 87-octane have extra money in 
their pocket. The translog cost function gives us the change in share of each good. It is a movement alo g 
the initial aggregate utility level, which is the substitution effect. However, in reality, that extra money 
will be spent either on additional gasoline or AOG. Therefore, we have to take into account the income 
effect experienced by the consumers. Since the consumers’ disposable income is fixed, if the translog unit
cost function is used based on the initial expenditures with the new prices, we will end up with shares of 
expenditure that have included the income effect. Wi h an assumption of homothetic preference, this 
approach results in an uncompensated demand function, which would result from the translog utility 
function. For this calibration, we use the published calibration method proposed by Rutherford (2002). 
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Using this function, we will look at the effect of l wering the price of premium gasoline on the 
consumption of other goods and whether savings can a tually be generated in Indonesia To have a 
demand function that replicates the gasoline market in Indonesia, the translog model is calibrated using 
expenditures, shares, prices and elasticities that are explained in further detail in the following section. 
4.3 Data 
For the analysis, 2012 data are used since they have been verified and finalized. The annual 
consumption and price of regular gasoline is readily available at Nota Keuangan APBN (Fiscal Note of 
State Budget) (Departemen Keuangan 2012). The consumption data on premium gasoline were available 
upon request from BPH Migas (The Downstream Oil and Gas Regulatory Agency). The price of premium 
fluctuates throughout the year; it ranges from Rp 8,500 in January (Detikoto 2012) to Rp 9,800 in October 
(Kompas 2012) for midgrade. There is no government institution that keeps track of the prices because 
the price of gasoline by grade, excluding regular, largely differs by region. Therefore, the author used 
news reports to record the lowest price of gasoline oth r than regular. Arguably, the mean of the price for 
midgrade and premium gasoline for the year is Rp 9,500. The unsubsidized and subsidized gasoline 
consumption are used to accurately calibrate the parameters. The household consumption data for the 
general equilibrium model is retrieved from Badan Pusat Statistik (2016c). These data in kiloliters and
local currencies are shown in the table below. 
Table 4.1 Annual consumption data for calibration 
 Purchases (kl) Price (Rp) Expenditure (Rp) Share 
Regular gasoline 28,256,849 4,500 1.27156E+14 2.83% 
Premium gasoline 1,020,514 9,500 9.69488E+12 0.22% 
Household consumption   4.49637E+15 96.96% 
Note: There were Rp 10,000  per USD in 2012. 
Notice that the price of AOG is required. For the analysis, the CPI is used, which is 100. Now 
that all benchmark expenditure shares for all the goods required in the model have been acquired, we can 
begin calibrating the translog cost function. 
4.4 Calibration process 
Following Rutherford (2002), the translog unit cost function is defined as: 
ln ( ) ≡ ln + ∑ ln + ∑ ∑ ln ≡ ln + ( )  (4.3) 
= 1,2,… -goods 
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= 1,2,… -goods 








+ ∑ ln   (4.4) 
For the calibration process, the following restrictions need to be incorporated: 
= 1 
=      ∀ ,∀  
= 0       ∀  
The calibration process involves finding the  and b parameters as shown below. 
= − 1 , ≠  
= − ,∀  
= − ln ,∀  
= ̅ ( )  
  ℎ  ℎ     
According to Rutherford (2002), the term  measures the responsiveness of the compensated 
demand for one input for a change in one input price. The formula is shown in Equation (4.5). 
=      (4.5) 
 is the compensated price elasticity (Mas-Colell et al. 1995) which is defined as  
= +     (4.6) 
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Based on the structure of the calibration and the restrictions, only three compensated cross-price 
elasticities are required for calibration since combining them with the symmetry restrictions  delivers the 
rest. Notice that the income elasticity is also required in finding the compensated cross-price elasticity. 
4.5 Calibration setup and results 
As previously mentioned, knowledge of the elasticities of gasoline with different grades is 
limited. We are aware of no previous studies aside from our own that have estimated the cross-price 
elasticities between regular and premium. Therefore, we will be using the cross-price elasticity based on 
the results of the second essay that found the cross-price elasticity of regular gasoline with respect to the 
price of premium in Mexico. We also include one stand rd deviation of this cross-price elasticity and its 
effect on government expenditure. In addition, a study by Hastings et al. (2013) on U.S. data found that 
gasoline expenditure is not exchangeable with other income leaving zero cross-price elasticities betwen 
AOG and the two gasoline grades. The benchmark setup for calibration is shown in Table 4.2.  
Notice that the income elasticities for both regular and premium gasoline are initially 1 because 
we assume that the utility function is homothetic. Using Equation (4.5) and (4.6), the calibration method 
is straightforward and the resulting parameters are shown in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.2 The calibration setup 
Equation Value 
Cross-price elasticities between 83 and 87 0.895 
Cross-price elasticities between 83 and AOG 0 
Cross-price elasticities between 85 and AOG 0 
Income elasticities of 83 1 
Income elasticities of 87 1 
 
Table 4.3 The calibration result for the base case 
 -0.0360 
=  0.0360 
=  0 
 -0.0360 









Equation (4.4) provides the compensated demand function for each good. Using the calibrated 
parameters in Table 4.3, the compensated demands ca be used to determine the optimal rate of subsidy 
shown in Equation (4.2). However, the non-linear nature of the translog function presents great difficulty 
in finding the closed form solution. An alternative approach to measure the effectiveness of the new 
subsidy is to perform simulations. We simulate the government’s expenditure with different rates of 
subsidy for premium gasoline based on Equation (4.1). 
The data for the subsidy rate of regular gasoline are unavailable, but we can work out the amount 
based on the fuel subsidy budget from Statistics Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistik 2016). According to the 
Fiscal Report and State Budget (Departemen Keuangan 2012), 61% of the fuel subsidy is intended for 
gasoline. We assume that the budget for gasoline subsidy is used up and thus, subsidy per liter can be 
calculated using the consumption data. This approach results in a subsidy rate of approximately Rp 
3,500/liter. Hence, the rate of subsidy for premium gasoline ranges from Rp 1 to Rp 3,500 per liter. 
 
Figure 4.1 Government total spending on the gasoline subsidy 
In the benchmark scenario, the gasoline subsidy expenditure decreases by 11.5% or roughly 11.4 
trillion rupiahs (or 950 million USD) when the subsidy rate is Rp 2,254/liter. The effect of the new 
subsidy is shown in Figure 4.1. The figure shows the range of savings generated with one standard 
deviation of cross-price elasticities. Within one standard deviation, the decrease in gasoline subsidy 
expenditure ranges between 4.2% and 19.4% at the optimal rate. The result illustrates that there is indeed 
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potential savings induced by introducing the new subsidy scheme. We expect that the savings are 
generated by consumers who switch from regular to pemium gasoline. Figure 4.2 depicts the changes in 
consumption of regular and premium gasolines. 
 
Figure 4.2 Consumption of different grades of gasoline 
As expected, the consumption of regular gasoline decreases while the consumption of premium 
gasoline increases. Since there is no substitutability etween gasoline and AOG, there will be no changes 
in the share expenditures between gasoline and AOG. 
4.7 Sensitivity analyses 
The simulation in the last section is based on the benchmark parameters that we chose. The 
parameters are: three cross-price and two income elasticities for each type of gasoline in Table 4.2. Given 
the high degree of uncertainty for these parameters, we will do sensitivity tests on all five parameters. We 
suspect that the cross-price elasticity will be important and we include cross-price sensitivity with all 
other parameters. The elasticity values are based on earlier research on substitutes for gasoline suchas 
diesel, alcohol and ethanol. The cross-price elasticity values that will be used in the sensitivity analyses 
are shown in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4 The cross-price elasticity for sensitivity tests 
Substitute Elasticity Data Source 
Ethanol 0.230 Brazil Alves et al. (2003) 
Diesel 0.349 Developing countries Miklius et al. (1986) 
Premium 0.895 Mexico Essay 2 
Ethanol 1.200 Minnesota Anderson (2012) 
Ethanol 1.473 Brazil He (2013) 
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The sensitivity analyses involve changing the value of the parameters and thus the calibration 
process has to be repeated. Since we are interested in the effect of the magnitude of the savings with 
changes in the parameters, we will look for the case for minimum government spending in each scenario 
that provides the maximum savings. The results of the simulations can be used for policy makers to 
determine whether the new subsidy policy is considere  worthwhile. Again, we cannot refer to the 
existing literature for any income elasticities used for the parameters other than the second essay. In the 
literature, income elasticities are only available for overall gasoline. These values will be used in the 
sensitivity tests as they might reflect the true income elasticities for both regular and premium gasoline. 
These elasticity values are shown in Table 4.5. We also added a value of 0.5 to cover a wide range of 
elasticities. 
Table 4.5 The income elasticity for sensitivity tests 
Income Elasticity Data Source 
0.500 - - 
0.727** Mexico Essay 2 
0.860* Indonesia Sa’ad (2009) 
1.000 - - 
1.890* Indonesia Dahl (2012) 
Note: * represents elasticity for overall gasoline. ** represents elasticity for regular gasoline respectively. 
The first sensitivity analyses are performed on different values for the income elasticity of 83-
octane and the results are shown in table 4.6. When the cross-price elasticity is small (first column), the 
savings are significantly different. For our base case income elasticity of regular gasoline (the fourth 
row), the savings range from 1.14% to 20.94%. Meanwhile, it turns out that income elasticity of regular 
gasoline has a small impact on the savings generated. The magnitude of the savings is basically robust to 
the income elasticity of regular gasoline. We can clearly see that for our base case cross-price elasticity 
(the third column with cross-price elasticity of 0.895), the savings generated range from 11.47% to 
11.52%. Also, notice that a higher income elasticity of regular gasoline (shown in the last row) is actu lly 
beneficial to the success of the new subsidy scheme. Although savings are generated for all scenarios, the 
magnitude depends largely on the cross-price elasticity between regular and premium gasoline. The 





Table 4.6 Sensitivity test results for the cross-price elasticity and income elasticity of 83-octane 












savings ∗ savings ∗ savings ∗ savings ∗ savings ∗ 
0.500 1.14% 1474 2.82% 1837 11.47% 2254 16.45% 2321 20.92% 2357 
0.727 1.15% 1476 2.83% 1838 11.48% 2254 16.46% 2321 20.93% 2357 
0.860 1.15% 1478 2.83% 1839 11.49% 2254 16.46% 2321 20.93% 2357 
1.000 1.16% 1479 2.84% 1840 11.49% 2254 16.47% 2321 20.94% 2357 
1.890 1.18% 1488 2.87% 1843 11.52% 2255 16.50% 2321 20.97% 2357 
Note: The values are the percentage of the savings generated. The shaded block is the benchmark that was 
used in simulation in the previous section. The savings are based on the optimal subsidy rate (∗) 
measured in Rupiah. 
Next, sensitivity analysis is also performed with different income elasticity values of 87-octane. 
We use the same income elasticity values as for regular above. We expect that the income elasticities for 
premium gasoline will have a large impact on the magnitude of the savings generated. As the price of 
premium gasoline is lower, there is an income effect for those who have been purchasing 87-octane 
gasoline. If the income elasticity is high, most of he extra money in their pocket will be spent on 
additional premium gasoline. The result of the sensitivity tests are shown in Table 4.7. The base case 
cross-price elasticity is in the third column with cross-price elasticity of 0.895. The savings range from 
10.82% to 11.91%. This confirms our prediction that t e income elasticity of premium gasoline has a 
significant effect on the magnitude of savings generated. A higher value is detrimental to the success of 
the new subsidy scheme since least savings are in th  last row, while the cross-price elasticity remains an 
important factor. In addition, the optimal rate of subsidy is sensitive to a change in income elasticity of 
premium gasoline. 
The last parameter to be tested is the cross-price elasticity between 87-octane and AOG. The 
cross-price elasticity between 83-octane and AOG will not have any effect since the proposed subsidy 
only alters the price of premium gasoline. Since we cannot refer to any studies on substitutability of 
gasoline and AOG, we use a range from 0 to 2 in increments of 0.5. The reason behind the positive values 
is because we would expect consumers to treat AOG as a substitute for gasoline. Basically, the mindset is 
that if gasoline is cheaper, that means I can spend more on other goods. We expect that high 
substitutability between 87-octane and AOG will reduce the savings generated. If 87-octane and AOG are 
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interchangeable, a decrease in the price of premium gasoline will bring consumers towards purchasing 
87-octane. This will increase the government’s expenditure on subsidies. The result is shown in Table 4.8. 
Table 4.7 Sensitivity test results for the cross-price elasticity and income elasticity of 87-octane 












savings ∗ savings ∗ savings ∗ savings ∗ savings ∗ 
0.500 1.33% 1668 3.11% 1987 11.91% 2321 16.91% 2371 21.39% 2399 
0.727 1.24% 1577 2.98% 1917 11.71% 2290 16.70% 2348 21.18% 2379 
0.860 1.20% 1527 2.91% 1879 11.60% 2273 16.59% 2335 21.06% 2368 
1.000 1.16% 1479 2.84% 1840 11.49% 2254 16.47% 2321 20.94% 2357 
1.890 0.94% 1231 2.46% 1626 10.82% 2145 15.74% 2236 20.17% 2286 
Note: The values are the percentage of the savings generated. The shaded block is the benchmark that was 
used in simulation in the previous section. The savings are based on the optimal subsidy rate (∗) 
measured in Rupiah. 
As expected, the cross-price elasticity between 87-octane and AOG greatly affects the magnitude 
of the savings. For our base case cross-price elasticity, shown in the third column with cross-price 
elasticity of 0.895, the savings range from 10.05% to 11.49%. The impact seems to be more significant 
than the effect of different income elasticities of each regular and premium gasoline. The optimal rate of 
subsidy also differs significantly based on the cross-price elasticity of AOG and premium gasoline. The 
assumption of no substitution between gasoline expenditure and AOG was based on U.S. consumers, if 
this does not hold for Indonesia, the subsidy savings are lower. 
Table 4.8 Sensitivity test results for the cross-price elasticity with all other goods (AOG) 












savings ∗ savings ∗ savings ∗ savings ∗ savings ∗ 
0.0 1.16% 1479 2.84% 1840 11.49% 2254 16.47% 2321 20.94% 2357 
0.5 1.02% 1324 2.60% 1709 11.09% 2190 16.03% 2271 20.49% 2315 
1.0 0.92% 1199 2.41% 1596 10.72% 2129 15.63% 2223 20.06% 2275 
1.5 0.83% 1096 2.24% 1497 10.37% 2071 15.24% 2177 19.64% 2237 
2.0 0.76% 1009 2.09% 1410 10.05% 2017 14.87% 2133 19.24% 2200 
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Note: The values are the percentage of the savings generated. The shaded block is the benchmark that was 
used in simulation in the previous section. The savings are based on the optimal subsidy rate (∗) 
measured in Rupiah. 
The sensitivity analyses results indicate that the consumers’ responsiveness to the changes in the 
price of premium gasoline is beneficial for the government, especially if consumers switch from the 
highly subsidized regular gasoline. For all cases, there is always a reduction in the gasoline subsidy 
expenditure. However, it is up to the policy makers to decide whether this amount of savings is signifcant 
enough to be considered worthwhile. However, the new subsidy policy introduces a new distortion in 
both gasoline markets, and thus in the next section, we provide policy makers with the effect of the new 
subsidy on consumer welfare. 
4.8 Welfare effect 
In the case that the government is a social planner, th  objective is to maximize social welfare 
rather than savings generated. For tractability and simplicity, the welfare effect analysis is only on
consumers. We assume that the gasoline supply curveis perfectly elastic with no capacity constraint. 
Consequently, we ignore any change in the welfare of gasoline producers. 
In order to determine the change in the welfare of the consumers, we use the compensating 
variation (CV) approach. The newly introduced subsidy on premium gasoline means that overall gasoline 
is more affordable. Therefore, the aggregate utility level of consumers should be higher because they can 
purchase more goods. If the consumers’ utility level is unchanged, they are indifferent. Hence, the amount 
of money that can be taken from the aggregate consumers, to get them back to the utility level before th  
introduction of the new subsidy, is the change in the consumers’ welfare. 
As an illustration, the demand curve for both regular and premium gasoline can be constructed 
using the same approach that we used for the simulations. In this case, instead of looking at the 
government’s expenditure, we look at the amount of gasoline, regular and premium, that is purchased by 
aggregate consumers at each price. By solving the quantity purchased by the consumers at each price, we 
are basically drawing the inverse demand of both regular and premium gasoline market. We still use the 
benchmark scenario with the subsidy of Rp 2,254/liter for premium. 
The inverse compensated demand for premium gasoline is shown in Figure 4.3. For the 87-octane 
market, the new subsidy will not affect the demand curve for premium gasoline and the only change is the 
supply curve. Instead of having a perfectly elastic upply curve at Rp 9,500, the curve shifted downwards 
to Rp 7,246. This is shown in the figure and labeled as optimal price. There is a deadweight loss because 




Figure 4.3 The inverse demand curve for premium gasoline 
For regular gasoline, it is a little more complicated as shown in Figure 4.4. The new subsidy on 
premium gasoline causes the demand for regular gasoline t  decrease, and thus shifts the demand curve 
left. The decrease in demand is shown by the shift of nitial inverse compensated demand curve (D) to the 
new demand curve (D’). The quantity of regular gasoline purchased decreases from Q* to Q*’. Initially, 
the deadweight loss is the area between the world price and the demand, shown by area A + B. After the 
introduction of the new subsidy, the deadweight loss becomes the area A + C. Therefore, there is an 
inefficiency reduction of B, but there is also an addition of C. There will be an efficiency gain if B > C. 
 
Figure 4.4 The inverse uncompensated demand curve fo  r gular gasoline 
We compute these changes with the translog unit cost function as shown in Equation (4.3). The 
expenditure level is basically aggregate household expenditure. Thus, we only need to determine the 
difference in the required cost with the introduction of the new subsidy. We use the benchmark 
parameters and the subsidy rate chosen for premium gasoline as based on the maximum saving generated, 
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Rp 2,254/liter. According to our model, the amount of money that can be taken away from consumers to 
make them as well off as they were before the additional subsidy is 6.8 trillion rupiahs or roughly 560 
million USD. We also check for one standard deviation of the cross-price elasticity value. If the cross-
price elasticity is one standard deviation higher, the consumers are better off by 9.6 trillion rupiahs (or 
802 million USD). Meanwhile, with one standard deviation lower, the CV value is 3.8 trillion rupiahs (or 
315 million USD). Since all the CV values are positive, this confirms that the new subsidy not only 
lowers the government’s expenditure on gasoline subsidies, but also the inefficiency in the gasoline 
market.  
4.9 Conclusion and shortcomings 
This essay contributes to the literature by providing an analysis of an alternative policy of 
different price control on gasoline with different grades. Indonesia only provides a subsidy for regular 
gasoline and such a policy affects consumption preferences for both regular and premium gasoline. The 
effects on both markets are analyzed for a new governm nt subsidy on premium gasoline. The simulation 
results confirm that implementing a subsidy for premium gasoline is beneficial for the government. In the
base case, it reduces the expenditure on overall gaso ine subsidies by 11.5% or around 950 million USD. 
It also improves consumer welfare as the government ca  take away 6.8 trillion rupiahs (or 560 million 
USD) from aggregate consumers and leave them as well off as before. Even though the new policy 
introduces inefficiency in the premium gasoline market, the overall result is a reduction in inefficiency. 
This new policy provides policy-makers with an alternative strategy to free up its expenditure 
budget to fund other programs with greater impact on economic growth. Politically speaking, this 
alternative policy may be more easily executed by the government instead of removing the gasoline 
subsidy entirely. Such a subsidy reduction faces strong resistance from the public and could cause a 
political backlash. However, the existence of potential savings is largely determined by the cross-price 
elasticity between regular and premium gasoline. Given the very limited studies on this issue, the 
magnitude of the savings generated ranges significatly. For the case of Indonesia, further research on 
gasoline with different grades using Indonesian gasoline market data are required should the policy-
makers require more accurate computations of the savings. 
There are shortcomings that could affect the accuray of the results. First, the assumption that 
there is no substitutability between gasoline expenditure and AOG is based on U.S. data (Hastings et al.
2013). The GDP/capita of Indonesia, that represents its income, is substantially different with the U.S. 
that has an income that is around 15 times as large. This difference in income might affect consumption 
behavior and thus, the assumption of no substitutability might not hold. Secondly, the responsiveness of 
consumers with the change in price is never considered. The second essay shows that in the short-run 
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(monthly and annual) Mexican consumers do not respond t  the changes in price. In our model, we used 
the long run elasticities. How fast the consumers rspond will affect the magnitude of savings generated. 
Third, the translog function fails to capture the ev nt of all consumers switching to premium gasoline 
when regular gasoline becomes more expensive than premium gasoline. This might affect the accuracy of 
the inefficiency reduction. This happens when the price of regular is greater than Rp 7,246/liter. If we
were to force this effect, we could truncate the demand curve for regular gasoline above Rp 7,246/liter but 
would need to determine how much of the lost consumption would be transferred to the premium market.  
Also, there are issues that were not even considered that could affect the viability of the new 
subsidy policy. The demand for gasoline is always increasing as the country becomes more developed and 
thus the inefficiency in the premium gasoline market might build up in the future and potentially put an
even higher financial burden on the government. Furthermore, the new policy lowers transportation costs 
and might distort other markets. Implementation cost of the policy is also ignored. If the cost is hig, it 
might offset the savings. Lastly, the effect on the supply side is never addressed. The issues are the 




CHAPTER 5  
CONCLUSION 
A gasoline subsidy, which is a policy implemented by oil-rich countries to distribute welfare to 
their people, results in inefficiency in the gasoline market. Significantly higher gasoline prices most of the 
time since 2000 fueled by economic progress have caused a substantial increase in the cost of the policy. 
These governments are aware of the problem, yet fac difficulties, since subsidy removal policy has often 
met with public protests leading to riots and violenc  even before it was executed.  
This thesis has explored the idea of subsidy removal from a government’s perspective of wanting 
to stay in office while reducing the cost of the sub idy. There have been numerous studies on the impact 
of lifting the subsidy, yet none focus on the decision-making process of the government. The first essay 
provides insights on how the government should proceed if the goal is to remove the subsidy, partially or 
entirely. The government should pay close attention to the decrease in the purchasing power of the 
general population and the drop in its popularity, and ultimately political power, in order to successfully 
execute the removal policy. The preference of the government and also the general population play an 
important role in how far the government can cut the subsidy.  
If taking the subsidy is off the table, these governments could look into an alternative policy of 
introducing a new subsidy on higher-octane gasoline but at a lower rate with no change in the subsidy rate
for regular gasoline. Such a policy presents less of a political constraint because regular gasoline is 
commonly associated with low income groups and thus, the subsidy on premium would not make the 
poor people worse off. In the case of Indonesia that only subsidizes regular gasoline, this alternative 
policy has a great impact on the overall cost of the subsidy. The magnitude of the savings is largely 
dependent on the cross-price elasticity of regular gasoline with respect to the price of premium gasoline 
that is examined in the second essay. There is very limited study on gasoline with different grades. 
Estimation results on Mexican data, the only data that we have located for an emerging market, suggest 
high substitutability between regular and premium gasoline.  
However, the new subsidy on premium gasoline causes a change in consumption pattern and 
could cause higher inefficiency in both regular andpremium gasoline markets. A unique contribution of 
the third essay is to simulate different rates of subsidy on premium gasoline and its effect on Indonesia’s 
gasoline market. The simulations provide policy-makers with the amount of savings that could be 
generated from such policy. The effect on consumer welfare is also analyzed to provide details of the 
inefficiency in the regular and premium gasoline market.  
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In conclusion, this thesis has provided insights on h w the government decides whether to 
remove the subsidy or keep a gasoline subsidy. An altern tive policy is also presented that could be 
successful in reducing the cost of the overall subsidy and its inefficiency, at least for Indonesia’s gasoline 
market. The models and analyses could be used by polic -makers in countries that provide gasoline 
subsidies should they seek to reduce inefficiency i their domestic gasoline market. The significant drop 
in the price of crude oil in recent years presents a great opportunity for these countries to remove the 
subsidy while keeping the gasoline price intact. If here is no change in the price, arguably the consumers 
do not care and will not complain. However, due to volatility of international crude oil market, these 
governments might face difficulties in the future. Should the price of crude oil increase substantially, they 






Adam, L., & Lestari, E. (2008). Ten years of reforms: The impacts of an increase in the price of oil on 
welfare. Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities, 1, 121-139.  
Alesina, A., & Perotti, R. (1996a). Income distribution, political instability, and investment. European 
Economic Review, 40(6), 1203-1228. 
Alesina, A., Özler, S., Roubini, N., & Swagel, P. (1996b). Political instability and economic 
growth. Journal of Economic growth, 1(2), 189-211. 
Alves, D. C., & da Silveira Bueno, R. D. L. (2003). Short-run, long-run and cross elasticities of gasoline 
demand in Brazil. Energy Economics, 25(2), 191-199. 
Anderson, S. T. (2012). The demand for ethanol as a gasoline substitute. Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management, 63(2), 151-168. 
Andrews, D. W. (1993). Tests for parameter instability and structural change with unknown change 
point. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 821-856.  
Ariyanti, Fiki. (2014). "Rupiah jeblok, RI bakar duit Rp 210 triliun buat subsidi BBM." Liputan6. 
http://bisnis.liputan6.com/read/793057/rupiah-jeblok-ri-bakar-duit-rp-210-triliun-buat-subsidi-bbm 
Badan Pusat Statistik. (2016a). Actual government expenditures. 
https://www.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatis/view/id/1287 
Badan Pusat Statistik. (2016b). State budget. https://www.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatis/view/id/1178 
Badan Pusat Statistik. (2016c). “Gross domestic product by type of expenditure, gross national product, 
and national income at current market prices (billion rupiahs), 2000-2013”. 
http://www.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatis/view/id/1249 
Beaton, C., & Lonton, L. (2010). Lessons learned from Indonesia's attempts to reform fossil-fuel 
subsidies. C. Beaton & L. Lonton,  International Institute for Sustainable Development. 
Biello, David. (2007). "Fact or fiction?: Premium gasoline delivers premium benefits to your car." 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/fact-or-fiction-premium-g/ 
Bloomberg. (2014). “Fuel smugglers line up every dato drain Indonesia economy”. Bloomberg. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-10-12/fuel-smugglers-line-up-every-day-to-drain-
indonesia-s-economy 
Bridel, A., & Lontoh, L. (2014). Lessons Learned: Malaysia’s 2013 Fuel Subsidy Reform. Geneva: 
Global Subsidies Initiative of International Institute for Sustainable Development. 
https://www.iisd.org/GSI/sites/default/files/ffs_malaysia_lessonslearned.pdf 
Bueno de Mesquita, B. (2005). The logic of political survival. MIT press. 
Chiang, A. C., & Wainwright, K. (2005). Fundamental methods of mathematical economics. McGraw-
Hill, New York.  
69 
 
Christensen, L. R., Jorgenson, D. W., & Lau, L. J. (1973). Transcendental logarithmic production 
frontiers. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 28-45. 
Christensen, L. R., Jorgenson, D. W., & Lau, L. J. (1975). Transcendental logarithmic utility functions. 
The American Economic Review, 65(3), 367-383.  
Chu, Jennifer. (2014). "Shifting up to higher octane." http://newsoffice.mit.edu/2014/premium-gas-could-
save-fuel-money-1028 
Clements, B., JUNG, H. S., & Gupta, S. (2007). Real and distributive effects of petroleum price 
liberalization: the case of Indonesia. The Developing Economies, 45(2), 220-237.  
Coady, D. (2015). The Unequal Benefits of Fuel Subsidies Revisited. International Monetary Fund. 
Coady, D., Gillingham, R., Ossowski, R., Piotrowski, J., Tareq, S., & Tyson, J. (2010). Petroleum 
product subsidies: costly, inequitable, and rising. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.  
Cochrane, Joe. (2013). “Indonesia struggles to end fuel subsidies”. The New York Times. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/03/business/global/03iht-subsidy03.html?_r=1 
Dahl, C. A. (2012). Measuring global gasoline and diesel price and income elasticities. Energy Policy, 41, 
2-13.  
Dartanto, T. (2013). Reducing fuel subsidies and the implication on fiscal balance and poverty in 
Indonesia: A simulation analysis. Energy Policy, 58, 117-134.  
Davis, L. W. (2014). The economic cost of global fuel subsidies. The American Economic 
Review, 104(5), 581-585. 
del Granado, F. J. A., Coady, D., & Gillingham, R. (2012). The unequal benefits of fuel subsidies: A 
review of evidence for developing countries. World Development, 40(11), 2234-2248.  
Departemen Keuangan. (2012). Nota keuangan APBN 2013. 
http://www.anggaran.depkeu.go.id/dja/acontent/Nota%20Keuangan%20RAPBN%202013.pdf 
Detikoto. (2012). “Waduh! Harga pertamax dan bensin Shell makin mahal”. Detikcom. 
http://oto.detik.com/read/2012/01/16/082131/1816150/ 2 7/waduh-harga-pertamax-dan-bensin-shell-
makin-mahal 
Diop, Ndiame. (2014). Why is reducing energy subsidie  a prudent, fair, and transformative policy for 
Indonesia?. World Bank-Economic Premise, (140), 1-6. 
Durbin, J. (1954). Errors in variables. Review of the International Statistical Institute 22: 23–32. 
Durbin, J. (1970). Testing for serial correlation in least-squares regressions when some of the regressors 
are lagged dependent variables. Econometrica 38: 410–421. 
Economist. (2014). Iran: Cut those subsidies. http://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2014/04/iran 
Elliott, G. R., T. J. Rothenberg, and J. H. Stock. (1996). Efficient tests for an autoregressive unit root. 
Econometrica 64: 813–836. 
70 
 
Engle, R. F. (1982). Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity with estimates of the variance of 
United Kingdom inflation. Econometrica 50: 987–1007. 
Engle, R., & Granger, C. (1987). Co-integration anderror correction: Representation, estimation, and 
testing. Econometrica, 55(2), 251-276.  
Farzin, M. Reza, Guillaume, D. M., & Zytek, R. (2011). Iran-the chronicles of the subsidy reform. IMF 
Working Papers, 1-28. 
Federal Reserve Economic Data. (2016). Consumer Price Index: All items for Mexico. 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MEXCPIALLMINMEI 
Fullerton Jr, T. M., Salazar, J. A. I., & Elizalde, M. (2015). Microeconomic gasoline consumption 
anomalies in Mexico: 1997-2007. Asian Economic and Financial Review, 5(4), 709-722. 
http://www.aessweb.com/pdf-files/aefr-2015-5(4)-709-722.pdf 
Gie, Kwik Kian. (2011). “Pemerintah melanggar konstitu i dalam kebijakannya menaikkan harga BBM”. 
http://kwikkiangie.com/v1/2011/03/pemerintah-melanggar-konstitusi-dalam-kebijakannya-
menaikkan-harga-bbm-artikel-3-pelengkap/ 
Godfrey, L. G. (1978). Testing against general autoregressive and moving average error models when the 
regressors include lagged dependent variables. Econometrics 46: 1293–1301. 
Goldstone, J. A., Bates, R. H., Epstein, D. L., Gurr, T. R., Lustik, M. B., Marshall, M. G., ... & 
Woodward, M. (2010). A global model for forecasting political instability. American Journal of 
Political Science, 54(1), 190-208. 
Harsanyi, J. C. (1962). Measurement of social power in n‐person reciprocal power situations. Behavioral 
Science, 7(1), 81-91.  
Harvey, R., & Gayer, T. (2013). Public finance. McGraw-Hill Higher Education.  
Hastings, J. S., & Shapiro, J. M. (2013). Fungibility and consumer choice: Evidence from commodity 
price shocks. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128(4), 1449-1498.  
Hausman, J. A. (1978). Specification tests in econometrics. Econometrica 46: 1251–1271. 
He, Y. (2013). Impacts of flexible-fuel vehicles on Brazil's fuel markets. (Doctoral dissertation, Rutgers 
University-Graduate School-New Brunswick). http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.7282/T3Z899FH 
Howell, L. D. (2011). International country risk guide methodology. East Syracuse, NY: PRS Group. 
http://www.prsgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/icrgmethodology.pdf 
INEGI. (2016). “Banco de informacion economica”. http://www.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/bie/ 
International Energy Agency. (2015). Statistics for Indonesia. 
http://www.iea.org/statistics/statisticssearch/report/?year=2012&country=Indonesia&product=Oil 
Ito, K., & Sallee, J. M. (2014). The Economics of Attribute-Based Regulation: Theory and Evidence from 
Fuel-Economy Standards (No. w20500). National Bureau of Economic Research.  
71 
 
Jong-A-Pin, R. (2009). On the measurement of politica  instability and its impact on economic 
growth. European Journal of Political Economy, 25(1), 15-29. 
Kojima, M. (2013). Petroleum product pricing and complementary policies: experience of 65 developing 
countries since 2009. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, (6396). 
Kompas. (2012). “Harga pertamax kembali naik”. Kompas. 
http://bisniskeuangan.kompas.com/read/2012/10/01/102 4342/Harga.Pertamax.Kembali.Naik 
Kompas. (2015). “Survei Poltracking: Elektabilitas Jokowi merosot di bawah Prabowo”. Kompas. 
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2015/10/20/14323571/Survei.Poltracking.Elektabilitas.Jokowi.Mero
sot.di.Bawah.Prabowo 
Koran Sindo. (2014). Sejarah harga BBM subsidi di In onesia. Okezone. 
http://economy.okezone.com/read/2014/08/28/19/103092 /sejarah-harga-bbm-subsidi-di-indonesia 
Loveless, Bill. (2015). World Bank economists seek oil subsidies' end. 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2015/04/15/loveless-imf-world-bank-oil-
prices/25844293/ 
Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M. D., & Green, J. R. (1995). Microeconomic theory (Vol. 1). New York: 
Oxford university press. 
Miklius, W., Leung, P., Siddayao, C.M., (1986). Analyzing demand for petroleum-based fuels in the 
transport sectors of developing countries in energy decisions for the future challenges and 
opportunities, in:  Miyata, M., Matsui, K. (Eds), Proceedings of the International Association of 
Energy Economists 8th International Meeting, Tokyo, Japan, 1271-1292.  
Monroe, K. R. (1978). Economic influences on presidntial popularity. Public Opinion Quarterly, 42(3), 
360-369. 
Mundlak, Y. (1968). Elasticities of substitution and the theory of derived demand. The Review of 
Economic Studies, 35(2), 225-236. 
Nash, J. (1950). The bargaining problem. Econometrica, 18(2), 155-162. 
Ng, S., & Perron, P. (1995). Unit root tests in ARMA models with data-dependent methods for the 
selection of the truncation lag. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 90(429), 268-281. 
Ng, S., & Perron, P. (2001). Lag length selection and the construction of unit root tests with good size and 
power. Econometrica, 69(6), 1519-1554. 
Nicholson, W., & Snyder, C. (2011). Microeconomic theory: basic principles and extensions. Nelson 
Education.  
Oil and Gas Journal (OGJ). (2013). Mexico's price controls. Oil and Gas Journal. 
http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-111/issue-9c/regular-features/editorial/mexico-s-price-
controls.html 
Pesaran, M. H., & Shin, Y. (1998). An autoregressive distributed-lag modelling approach to cointegration 
analysis. Econometric Society Monographs, 31, 371-413. 
72 
 
Pesaran, M. H., Y. Shin, and R. J. Smith. (2001). Bounds testing approaches to the analysis of level 
relationships, Journal of Applied Econometrics 16 (3), 289-326. 
Plante, M. D., & Jordan, A. (2013). Getting prices right: addressing Mexico’s history of fuel subsidies’. 
Southwest Economy, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 10-13. 
Pradiptyo, R., & Sahadewo, G. A. (2012). A growing pain: an experimental approach to discover the most 
acceptable strategy for lifting fuel subsidy scheme in Indonesia. Available at SSRN 2015279. 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2015279  
Quiano, Kathy. (2012). “Thousands protest fuel price hike in Indonesia”. CNN. 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/22/business/indonesia-fuel price-protests/ 
Ramsey, F. P. (1927). A contribution to the theory of taxation. The Economic Journal, 37(145), 47-61.  
Ramsey, J. B. (1969). Tests for specification errors in classical linear least-squares regression analysis. 
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B 31: 350–371. 
Reuters. (2016). “Mexico’s gasoline demand is growing strongly”. Reuters. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/mexico-oil-kemp-idUSL5N18E3TV 
Rutherford, T. (2002). Lecture notes on constant elasticity functions. University of Colorado. 
http://www.gamsworld.eu/mpsge/debreu/ces.pdf 
Sa’ad, S. (2009). An empirical analysis of petroleum demand for Indonesia: An application of the 
cointegration approach. Energy Policy, 37(11), 4391-4396. 
Schwarz, G. (1978). Estimating the dimension of a model. The annals of statistics, 6(2), 461-464. 
Simanaitis, Dennis. (2012). “Premium fuel futures. A primer on high-test gasoline: Is it for you?” 
http://www.roadandtrack.com/new-cars/car-technology/news/a18008/premium-fuel-futures/ 
Staiger, D., & Stock, J. (1997). Instrumental variables regression with weak 
instruments. Econometrica, 65(3), 557-586. doi:10.2307/2171753 
Stiglitz, J. E., & Dasgupta, P. (1971). Differential xation, public goods, and economic efficiency. The 
Review of Economic Studies, 38(2), 151-174.  
Tempo. (2014). “Elektabilitas Jokowi 45 persen, Prabowo 38,7 persen”. Tempo. 
https://nasional.tempo.co/read/news/2014/06/26/078588236/elektabilitas-jokowi-45-persen-prabowo-
38-7-persen 
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). (2016a). “Petroleum and other liquids”. 
http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/data.cfm 
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). (2016b). “International Energy Statistics”. 
http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/data/browser/#/?pa=0000000001&tl_id=5-A&vs=INTL.62-2-
AFRC-TBPD.A&ord=SA&cy=2013&vo=0&v=H&start=1980&end=2014 
World Bank. (2012). Bantuan Langsung Tunai (BLT) temporary unconditional cash transfer. Social 
assistance program and public expenditure ; review no. 2; Public expenditure review (PER). 
73 
 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/652291468039239723/Bantuan-Langsung-Tunai-BLT-
temporary-unconditional-cash-transfer 
World Bank. (2015). "GDP per Capita (current LCU)." World Bank data. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CN 
Worstall, T. (2014). “Ben Bernanke: The 2008 financi l risis was worse than the Great Depression”. 
Forbes. http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2014/08/27/ben-bernanke-the-2008-financial-crisis-
was-worse-than-the-great-depression/#498c6ac677c0 
Wu, D.-M. (1974). Alternative tests of independence between stochastic regressors and disturbances: 
Finite sample results. Econometrica 42: 529–546. 
Yucatan Times. (2016). “Market gas prices could come to Mexico in January”. Yucatan Times. 
http://www.theyucatantimes.com/2016/09/market-gas-prices-could-come-to-mexico-in-january/ 
Zellner, A. (1962). An efficient method of estimating seemingly unrelated regressions and tests for 
aggregation bias. Journal of the American statistical Association, 57(298), 348-368. 
Zellner, A., and H. Theil. (1962). Three stage least squares: Simultaneous estimate of simultaneous 





Beritasatu. (2014). “Pemerintah masih memberi subsidi untuk BBM”. Beritasatu. 
http://sp.beritasatu.com/home/pemerintah-masih-memberi-subsidi-untuk-bbm/69328 
CME Group. (2015). Crude oil futures quotes. http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/energy/crude-oil/light-
sweet-crude.html 
Considine, T. J. (1989). Estimating the demand for energy and natural resource inputs: trade–offs in 
global properties. Applied Economics, 21(7), 931-945.  
Considine, T. J., & Mount, T. D. (1984). The use of linear logit models for dynamic input demand 
systems. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 434-443. 
Liputan 6. (2014). “Harga minyak anjlok, pemerintah sempat tak subsidi BBM”. Liputan 6. 
http://bisnis.liputan6.com/read/2154121/harga-minyak-anjlok-pemerintah-sempat-tak-subsidi-bbm 
Lütkepohl, H., & Krätzig, M. (2004). Applied time series econometrics. Cambridge university press. 
MacKuen, M. B. (1983). Political drama, economic conditions, and the dynamics of presidential 
popularity. American Journal of Political Science, 165-192. 
Nawangwulan, Maya. (2014). "DPR setujui APBN-P 2014." Tempo. 
http://nasional.tempo.co/read/news/2014/06/19/078586322/DPR-Setujui-APBN-P-2014 
Pindyck, R. S. (1979). Interfuel substitution and the industrial demand for energy: an international 
comparison. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 169-179. 
Pindyck, R. S. (1980). International comparisons of the residential demand for energy. European 
Economic Review, 13(1), 1-24.  
Rausser, G. C., Swinnen, J., & Zusman, P. (2011). Political power and economic policy: theory, analysis, 
and empirical applications. Cambridge University Press. 
Stone, D. (2002). Policy paradox: The art of political decision making. London and New York, NY: WW 
Norton and Company. 
The Economic Times. (2015). IMF applauds India for cutting fuel subsidy. 
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-0-18/news/58200783_1_fossil-fuel-subsidies-oil-
prices-energy-subsidies 






CROSS-PRICE ELASTICITY ESTIMATES USING TRANSLOG 
With flexible functional form, the demand model that is estimated contains a specific structure 
that agrees with economic theory. There are a lot of models that have been extensively used in the 
literature. We chose the translog because of its flexib e functional form. For the structural estimation, 
household expenditure is required. However, the data on household expenditure are annual. Therefore, the 
tertiary sector of GDP is used. The tertiary sector onsists of end-product consumption, and thus it 
exemplifies expenditures. These data are quarterly and thus we assume that consumption does not change 
significantly during those three months. The tertiary GDP data is averaged for all three months. The data
are in local currency units to match the prices of gasoline. We will be using the nominal price in the
analysis because the CPI is used to represent the price of all other goods. 
The transcendental logarithmic function, widely-known as translog function is chosen because of 
its flexible functional form. The obvious choice is to use the translog demand system (Christensen et. al 
1975). However, the share equations are non-linear i  nature and thus present great difficulty in 
estimation. As an alternative, the translog cost function (Christensen et. al 1973) is used as the model. 
Pindyck (1979, 1980) show how the translog cost functio  can be used to estimate demand using the cost 
function as shown below. 
ln = + ln + ∑ ( ) + ( ln ) + ∑ ∑ ( ) +∑ ( ) ln    (A.1) 
Where:  is the total cost 
 Q is the level of output 
 is price 
 = 1, 2, …  and  = 1, 2, …  
Using Shephards’s Lemma, the derived demand functions are found by differentiating the cost function 
with respect to the prices. The demand share functio  is shown in equation (A.2). 
= + ln + ∑     (A.2) 
In the estimation there will be three goods: good 1 is regular gasoline, good 2 is premium 
gasoline, and good 3 is all other goods (AOG). However, we only estimate two share equations because 
the shares always add up to 1. Furthermore, we put some restrictions on our model.  
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 :  =     ∀ ,  
 :  = 0    ∀  
The estimation result is shown in Table A.1. 
Table A.1 Estimation results for translog 
 Share regular Share premium 
 coefficient se coefficient se 
ln P   0.0099** (0.0010) 0.0043** (0.0006) 
ln P   0.0043** (0.0006) -0.0005 (0.0007) 
ln P   -0.0142** (0.0007) -0.0038** (0.0005) 
ln  0.0048** (0.0016) -0.0026* (0.0010) 
*, ** means significant at 5% and 1% 
 
 
According to Pindyck (1979), the cross-price elasticity in the translog demand system is: 
= =     (A.3) 
The own-price elasticity is given by the following equation: 
= =
( )
    (A.4) 




The result shows that the cross-price elasticity of regular gasoline with respect to the price of 
premium gasoline is 0.441. The value is significantly lower than the substitutability between ethanol and 
gasoline at 1.4728 (He 2010) and implies low substitutability between regular and premium gasoline. 





LINEAR LOGIT MODEL AND ESTIMATION  
Considine (1989) found shortcomings of the translog function for the case of energy where the 
demand is inelastic but the expenditure share is relativ ly low. Therefore, we also estimate and compare 
our results to the linear logit model in the next section. The model is shown below. 
ln = ( − ) + ∑ ( ∗ − ∗ ) ∗ + − ∑ ∗ ∗ − ∑ ∗ ∗ −
∗ ∗ ln + ∑ ( ∗ − ∗ ) ∗ + ( − ) ln + ( − )      (B.1) 
Where  is price 
 = 1, 2, … − 1 
 is the share of good i 
( ∗, ∗ … ∗ )  is specific set of share 
Similar to the translog demand system, we impose symmetry and homogeneity restrictions. 
 : ∗ = ∗     ∀ ,  
 :  ∗ = 0    ∀  
The estimation procedure follows Considine’s (1984) method. There are three goods: Good 1 is 
regular gasoline, good 2 is premium gasoline, and good 3 is all other goods (AOG). The estimation result 
is shown in Table B.1. 
Table B.1 Estimation results for linear logit 
 Share regular Share premium 
 coefficient se coefficient se 
ln P / P   -0.3606** (0.1037) 0.2574 (0.3853) 
ln P / P   2.0266** (0.1287) 2.9054** (0.4782) 
ln  0.4190* (0.1878) -2.9292** (0.6979) 
*, ** means significant at 5% and 1% 
 
 
According to Considine (1984), the cross-price elasticity is given by the formula: 
= ∗ ∗ − ∑ ∗ +     (B.2) 
The own-price elasticity is given by the following formula: 
78 
 
= ∗ ∗ − ∑ ∗ + − 1    (B.3) 
From equation (B.2), notice that we need values of ∗  to determine the cross-price elasticity. 
From the parameter estimates and equation (B.1), we hav  a system of equations involving ∗ as shown 
below. − ∗ ∗ − ∗ ∗ − ∗ ∗ = −0.3605887 − ∗ ∗ − ∗ ∗ − ∗ ∗ = 2.905438 ∗ ∗ − ∗ ∗ = 2.026589 ∗ ∗ − ∗ ∗ = 0.2574152 
The mean cost shares are used for the specific cost shares in the equations. Solving the system of 
equations result in the following parameters: 
Table B.2 The parameters resulting from solving the system of equations 
Parameter Value ∗  -2,449.95 ∗  1,238.16 ∗  1,211.80 ∗  -1,223.01 ∗  -15.14 ∗  -1196.65 
 




The cross-price elasticity at 2.012 is significantly different than the translog function result. This 
is probably because of the issue that was raised by Considine (1989). The value is even higher than the 
cross-price elasticity than gasoline has with ethanol, which is 1.47 (He 2013). However, the own-price 
elasticity of regular gasoline is quite unexpected an unbelievable. Again we were disappointed and 




REGULAR GASOLINE DEMAND ESTIMATION UNDER ENDOGENOUS PRICE 
Although our intuition and the statistical tests suggest that gasoline prices are exogenous, we 
present the results using two stage least squares fo  the interested reader. We use refinery acquisition cost 
for crude oil and refinery utilization capacity from the supply equation as instruments. Since INEGI does 
not provide these data for Mexico, the closest substit tes we could find are based on US refinery data. 
These data are retrieved from EIA (2016a) and converted to pesos using exchange rates from the FRED 
database (2016). 
The first stage of the regression involves estimation of regular and premium price of gasoline 
using the instruments from the supply function and lso all other variables other than prices used in the 
ARDL model. The second stage is to estimate the ARDL model using the predicted regular and premium 
gasoline price. The results are shown in the table be ow. 
Table C.1 Estimation results with 2sls 
 No IV 2sls 
 coefficient se coefficient se 
ln  -0.268** (0.0730) -1.424** (0.2422) 
Long-run 
ln P   -1.910** (0.3100) -2.457** (0.3673) 
ln P   0.895* (0.4564) 1.000 (0.6930) 
ln   0.727* (0.3409) 0.998** (0.3721) 
ln  2.524** (0.5555) 2.684** (0.4354) 
Short-run 
ln P   0.467 (0.6403) -2.447 (2.0302) 
ln P   -0.383 (0.3348) 1.869 (2.3025) 
ln   1.161** (0.4303) 2.182 (1.8422) 
ln  45.623 (34.249) - - 
  0.055** (0.0106) - - 
Adj R  0.852 0.848 
RMSE 0.0175 0.0181 
*, ** means significant at 5% and 1% 
Note: differenced ln  and  could not be included in the 2sls because of collinearity. 
For the long-run elasticity estimates, the results are relatively similar to the benchmark model. 
The values are slightly higher when using two-stage least square method. The noticeable difference is the 
short-run elasticity values. The coefficient estimates are all statistically insignificant even though the 
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values are larger. This confirms our prediction that e consumers would not have time to react 
immediately to changes in price and income. 
